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TORTURING THE LAW
Jos6 E. Alvarez t
I. INTRODUCTION
I accepted the invitation to address this symposium reluctantly. It is
distressing that lawyers, whose lives are, after all, dedicated to establishing
constraints on the exercise of arbitrary power, now find themselves address-
ing a topic that involves the ultimate exercise of arbitrary power over an-
other human being. Lawyers-of all people-should not be addressing tor-
ture and cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment as if this were just another
policy choice over which reasonable, civilized people can disagree.1 Yet the
t Hamilton Fish Professor of Law and Diplomacy, Columbia Law School; Visiting
Scholar, Pace University School of Law. This is an expanded version of a keynote address
presented at Case Western Reserve University School of Law on October 7, 2005. I am
grateful to Nate Lipscomb for able research assistance, to Diane Amann, David Bowker,
Scott Horton, Irma Russell, Mark Shulman, Gregory Shaffer, and Detlev Vagts for helpful
comments. Remaining errors are, of course, entirely my own.
1I leave to another day the very serious question of the possible role of the Bush Admini-
stration torture memoranda in normalizing the use of torture as a legitimate policy tool. Some
have suggested that the physical and sexual abuse of prisoners has for a long time taken place
in U.S. prisons, even in the United States, and that such abuse, albeit not usually the subject
of photographs published in the media, has long been tolerated, although not officially sanc-
tioned. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Mistreatment of Prisoners is Called Routine in US., N.Y.
TIMES, May 8, 2004, at A 1. Others contend, on the contrary, that there has been a pro-
nounced change in the way torture and detainee abuse is viewed after 9/11, noting the abun-
dant (and usually successful) deployment of torture now regularly depicted on recent televi-
sion shows, usually in contexts involving variations on the "ticking bomb" scenario. It is
argued that such depictions have acclimated Americans to the use of torture, at least in the
context of the "war" on terrorism, and lessened the level of shock once associated with it.
See, e.g., Adam Green, Normalizing Torture, One Rollicking Hour at a Time, N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 2005, § 2, at 34. Such cultural phenomena, along with the torture memoranda, may
be producing a legally relevant change insofar as, for example, U.S. due process jurispru-
dence prohibits only official conduct that "shocks the conscience." See, e.g., Rochin v. Cali-
fornia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). It may be that the American conscience may no longer be quite
as shocked by some of the forms of maltreatment that are condoned by these memoranda.
See, e.g., James Bacchus, The Garden, 28 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 308, 314-15, 320 (2005)
(noting that the abuses of Abu Ghraib were not uniformly condemned) (citing national polls
indicating that more than one third of Americans indicated that torture was legitimate in
some cases and only one third considered the abuses at Abu Ghraib to constitute "torture"). It
may be relevant, in this respect that one of the infamous torture memoranda suggests that the
relevant constitutional standard is what shocks the "contemporary conscience." See Working
Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of
Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations (Mar. 6, 2003), reprinted in THE
CASE W. RES. J. 1NT'L L.
actions of the United States government and its allies in the "War on Terror-
ism" appear to have made it necessary to revisit that 'hostis humanis
generis 2-the torturer.
As that astonishing paper trail of apparent complicity in torture, The
Torture Papers,3 indicates, we have discovered that the torturer is no longer
just the alien subject of the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"), that outsider
to the civilized rule of law operating in some Third World totalitarian shore
that we condemn so easily in large part because it makes us feel so superior.
The torturer is now us-distinguished, accomplished, highly credentialed
public servants and high government officials, current or former professors
of law at famous law schools, civil servants in the White House Counsel's
Office, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the Office of Legal Counsel
("OLC") within the U.S. Department of Justice, even one who has since
become a federal judge. None of these can be dismissed as "heathens" or
strangers to American morals, indeed some of the major players in The Tor-
ture Papers are known to be devout Christians.4 The high-level torturers
that are my subject are, in the words of Stephen Sondheim, our "princes ' '5-
members of an elite club of lawyers who attend conferences like these.
When legal princes are complicit in torture in rule of law states such
as the United States, their actions usually take a different shape than in, for
example, Filartiga-where the accused Inspector General of Police of
Asuncion, Paraguay himself tortured and killed without official warrant in
formal Paraguayan law. 6 When our high-level torturers act they do not do
so by ignoring the law or acting extra-legally but by systematic and rea-
TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 286 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel
eds., 2005) [hereinafter Memo 25]. Whether or not a change in the broader culture has oc-
curred, the use of torture has now become a much discussed potential policy tool in scholar-
ship, see, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor Strauss,
48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 275 (2004) (advocating the issuance of torture warrants in some
cases), and even in Congress. See, e.g., H.R. 10, 108th Cong. (2004). As originally intro-
duced by Rep. Dennis Hastert, this bill would have removed all protections from transfer of
those suspected of terrorism even when the transfer is intended to permit interrogation under
torture in foreign states.
2 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
3 TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1. All the memoranda cited in this essay are contained in
The Torture Papers and follow the numbered sequence in that volume.
4 See, e.g., Karen J. Greenberg, From Fear to Torture, in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1,
at xvii, xix (noting deeply religious beliefs of Bybee and Ashcroft). See also Adam Liptak,
Author of '02 Memo on Torture: 'Gentle' Soul for a Harsh Topic, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2004, at A l (describing, inter alia, Bybee's enthusiasm for the kazoo).
5 Stephen Sondheim, Liaisons,from A LITTLE NIGHT MUSIC (1973).
6 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
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soned misinterpretations of the law.7 This is not torture outside the law but,
ostensibly, under it. Graduates of Harvard or Yale Law Schools and former
clerks of the U.S. Supreme Court usually do not themselves strap people
down on water boards, attach electric wires to their appendages, handcuff
them in "stress" positions that cause them to suffocate, withhold vital medi-
cal treatment, or threaten naked detainees with attack dogs.8 Their positions
in society give them the luxury to write legal memoranda that authorize or
permit other people to do these things. 9 Indeed, in our legalistic culture they
usually have to. At least since Watergate, our lower level operatives have
learned that they risk being left high and dry unless they secure legal au-
7 See Greenberg, supra note 4, at xviii. There is no evidence that any of the writers of the
Administration's torture memoranda themselves engaged in the physical act of torture or of
inflicting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
8 This enumerates only some of the tactics reported to be deployed by U.S. personnel in
the course of interrogation or merely in the course of detention, particularly since September
1 th and not only in Abu Ghraib or Guantinamo. See, e.g., Jess Bravin & Gary Fields, How
Do U.S. Interrogators Make a Captured Terrorist Talk?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2003, at B I;
Don Van Natta, Jr., Questioning Terror Suspects in a Dark and Surreal World, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 2003, § 1, 14; Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, US. Decries Abuse but Defends Inter-
rogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al. See also John T. Parry, What is Torture, Are
We Doing It, and What If We Are?, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 237 (2003). None of the enumerated
tactics would necessarily constitute prohibited "torture" as narrowly defined by the most
detailed of the memoranda in Torture Papers that purport to define the term. See infra note
10.
9 As is further addressed below, the principal memoranda addressing permissible interro-
gation techniques drafted by Administration lawyers in 2002-2003 take such a narrow view
of the ban on torture and such an expansive view of permissible defenses for those accused
of torture that they appear to condone methods of interrogation by U.S. officials or agents
that would be generally regarded as torture by international authorities such as the Human
Rights Committee. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS,
supra note 1, at 172 [hereinafter Memo 14] (concluding that prohibited torture requires either
mental harm producing lasting psychological harm or severe pain of intensity comparable to
death or organ failure). As is also further addressed below, the Administration memoranda
also take a very narrow view of the reach of international and national prohibitions on the use
of torture outside of U.S. territory or by non-U.S. personnel. See generally Association of the
Bar of the City of New York & Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York
University School of Law, Torture by Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to
"Extraordinary Renditions" (Oct. 29, 2004), available at http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/Torture
ByProxy.pdf [hereinafter Torture by Proxy] (discussing the U.S. practice of transferring
individuals to a foreign state "in circumstances that make it more likely than not that the
individual will be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment."). See also
discussion of Memorandum from Jack Goldsmith, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to William H. Taft, IV et al., Regarding Draft Memorandum to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President, Re: Permissibility of Relocating Certain "Protected Persons" from
Occupied Iraq (Mar. 19, 2004), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1 [hereinafter
Memo 28].
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thorizations for their dirty deeds.' 0 This means that the commission of tor-
ture by those working on behalf of the United States entails not just physi-
cally demeaning acts (to both torturer and victim) but a second degradation:
torturing1 the law so that everyone can feel clean, or at least insulated from
the risk of prosecution, even though they are all, both high government offi-
cial and low level operative, in my view knee-deep in blood. The commis-
sion of torture by U.S. government officials usually requires torturing the
law. 12
10 See, e.g., Michael Hirsch et al., A Tortured Debate, NEWSWEEK, June 21, 2004, at 50
(indicating that the CIA, remembering how it had been blamed for prior covert plots, "made
sure that it had explicit, written authorization from lawyers and senior policymakers before
using new interrogation techniques").
" This reflects a common figurative use of the term "torture" and obviously not the legal
use, which is limited to an act done to another human being. To "torture" a word or the law
means to extremely distort its meaning, as to use a term to mean its opposite in Orwellian
fashion. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968): "[I]t is nothing less than sheer torture
of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a per-
son's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a 'search,"' cited
in Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105
COLUM. L. REv. 1681, 1698 n.79 (2005). This figurative use of the word "torture" does not
lessen its value or risk confusion. When I suggest, as I do throughout this essay, that the
Administration memoranda "torture" the law no one could possibly mistake this use for what
the term means in international human rights law or international humanitarian law. Nor is
my use of the term casual. I am not simply arguing that the torture memoranda "misconstrue"
or "misinterpret" the law, I am suggesting that many of the arguments presented in these
memoranda are so extremely at odds with the actual law they purport to be interpreting that a
more extreme perversion of the law is involved. I am also suggesting that, as Jeremy Wal-
dron has recently argued, the arguments in these memoranda are so fundamentally out of
bounds with what he calls central "archetypes" of American and international law that they
constitute nothing less than a torture of the rule of law itself. See id.
12 To this extent, I disagree with suggestions that abuses at Abu Ghraib were either the
unauthorized actions of a few "bad apples" or the product of an unintentionally lawless envi-
ronment due to understandable confusion over applicable law in the fog of war. Although the
abusers at Abu Ghraib indeed acted lawlessly, their actions appear to be the predictable con-
sequence of a series of high level government decisions, reflected in the memoranda con-
tained in The Torture Papers that appear intended to remove many of the constraints on the
treatment of those captured during the U.S.'s ongoing "war" on terrorism. See, e.g., Mark
Danner, The Logic of Torture, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, June 24, 2004; David W. Bowker, Un-
wise Counsel: The War on Terrorism and the Criminal Mistreatment of Detainees in US.
Custody, in THE TORTURE DEBATE iN AMERICA 183, 193-98 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006).
The memoranda in the The Torture Papers did not get the law wrong because of confusion
about which legal regime to apply. The text of the memoranda, when considered alongside
the public statements of Bush Administration officials, suggest conscious reinterpretations of
existing law, both national and international, intended to respond to alleged "new" circum-
stances faced by the United States in its new "war." See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gon-
zales, Counsel to the President, to George W. Bush, President, Decision Re Application of
the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban
(Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 118 [hereinafter Memo 7]
(recommending that the Geneva Conventions be determined not to apply to a "new para-
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What follows is a summary of the principal ways the Bush Admini-
stration's infamous torture memoranda-especially but not only those au-
thored by then Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo and then Assis-
tant Attorney General Jay Bybee-twisted, in small and large ways, interna-
tional law. 1
3
II. TORTURING THE LAW OF TREATIES
The torture memoranda misconstrue or ignore the various U.S.
treaty obligations that prohibit torture and inhuman treatment in various
contexts, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), the Convention Against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
("Torture Convention"), the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties
of Man (incorporated as a binding obligation on the U.S. through its adher-
ence to the Organization of American States ("OAS") Charter), and the
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees ("Refugee Convention"). 14
digm" of warfare involving Al Qaeda or the Taliban). Nor is it plausible to argue that the
lawyers responsible for these memoranda were simply ill-informed. There was no scarcity of
governmental insiders, including then Secretary of State Colin Powell, then U.S. State De-
partment Legal Adviser William H. Taft IV, and numerous military lawyers, who were under
no confusion as to which legal regime applied or when, but whose legal advice was ignored
by the drafters of the torture memoranda. See, e.g., John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture,
NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 26 (reporting objections by Taft, Powell, and military law-
yers). See also Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Draft Decision Memorandum for the Presi-
dent on the Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26,
2002), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 122 (presenting a more balanced list-
ing of the pros and cons of applying Geneva law to the conflict in Afghanistan). This is not
to suggest, however, that all the torture memoranda clearly acknowledge that their conclu-
sions constitute departures from existing law.
13 Much of what follows synthesizes or adds detail to critiques made by others. See, e.g.,
Bacchus, supra note 1; Waldron, supra note 11; Harold Hongju Koh, A World Without Tor-
ture, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 641 (2005); Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authori-
zations to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees,
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811 (2005); Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L.
REv. 2085 (2005).
14 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV]; see also common Article 3 Geneva III, supra note 14,
art. 3; Geneva IV, supra note 14, art. 3; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, [hereinafter
Torture Convention]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
art. 33, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention] (ban on refoule-
ment); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, arts. I &
XXV, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948).
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The torture memoranda conclude that the relevant obligations on in-
terrogation techniques in the third and fourth Geneva Conventions do not
apply to Al Qaeda or Taliban detainees or to "unlawful combatants" gener-
ally.15 As many critics have noted, these overbroad determinations ignore
the differences between regular and irregular forces under Article 4(A)(1)
and (2) of Geneva III, the plain meaning of Common Article 3, and the Ar-
ticle 5 requirement in Geneva III that in cases of doubt, determinations of
Prisoner of War ("POW") status need to be made by a competent tribunal
and not by the President acting alone.' 6 The authors of the memoranda tend
to treat the many Geneva provisions on point-from the requirement in Ar-
ticle 17 of Geneva III that prohibits any form of coercion against POWs to
15 See, e.g., Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., and Robert
J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to William J. Haynes 11, Gen. Counsel,
Dep't of Defense, Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan.
9, 2002), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 38 [hereinafter Memo 4]; Memo-
randum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def.,
Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002), re-
printed in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 81 [hereinafter Memo 6]; Memo 7, supra note
12, at 118; Memo 25, supra note 1, at 241.
16 See, e.g., ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMM. ON INT'L HUMAN
RIGHTS, COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS AND JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS APPLICABLE
TO THE UNITED STATES' INTERROGATION OF DETAINEES (2004), http://www.abcny.org/pdf/H
UMANRIGHTS.pdf; George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of
Illegal Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 891 (2002). Many experts in international humanitar-
ian law, including some U.S. JAG lawyers, dispute the Administration's apparent determina-
tions (1) that Afghanistan as a "failed state" was not entitled to the Geneva Conventions'
protections or (2) that Taliban forces were not entitled to POW protection because these only
extend to those individuals who meet the requisites identified in Article 4(A)(2) of Geneva
III. Article 4(A)(1) of Geneva III would appear to extend POW status to all the "armed
forces" of a party regardless of whether those conditions are satisfied and presumably the
United States would insist on such protections even for uninformed U.S. forces. Further,
even those who believe that the Taliban do not satisfy the requisites of Article 4, acknowl-
edge that Article 5 of Geneva III requires a "competent tribunal" to determine doubts about
POW status when such individuals fall "into the hands of the enemy" and not years later,
after detainees who might have been entitled not to be interrogated because they were POWs
have had their rights violated. Common Article 3 requires all persons not taking part in hos-
tilities, including those who have laid down their arms, to be treated "humanely," not to be
subjected to "cruel treatment" or "torture," and not to suffer "outrages upon personal dignity,
in particular humiliating and degrading treatment." Notably, these protections, which obvi-
ously go beyond a right not to be tortured, are not dependent on POW status and a violation
of this Article constitutes a "grave breach" or a war crime. Even some defenders of the Ad-
ministration's conclusions with respect to the inapplicability of Geneva law appear to con-
cede that there may be a difference between denying these protections to Al Qaeda fighters
and denying these rights to the Taliban and all other "unlawful combatants." See, e.g., John
Comyn, In Defense of Alberto R. Gonzales and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 9 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 213, 223 (2005) (defending the "core" conclusion that Al Qaeda fighters "have no
legal right to special POW privileges.").
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secure information to its Article 130 that makes inhuman treatment of
POWs a war crime-as matters of "non-binding" international law that
"could be cited to by other countries" and may therefore inform the De-
partment of Defense's "policy considerations."17
One of the most detailed memoranda concerning the "requirements
of international law" with respect to detainee interrogations dismisses the
significance of the ICCPR in a single paragraph. It notes only that the U.S.
has reserved on the relevant paragraph of that treaty such that the prohibi-
tion on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment means only
whatever is barred under the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution, that the Human Rights Committee can only consider
allegations of non-compliance, and that the U.S. "has maintained consis-
tently that the [ICCPR] does not apply outside the U.S."' 8 The authors of
this Working Group Report do not address how the jurisprudence of the
Human Rights Committee or the U.N.'s Human Rights Commission's Spe-
cial Rapporteur on Torture might affect the unreserved portion of Article 7
of the ICCPR (that is the meaning of "torture"), whether there are plausible
arguments that the relevant provisions of the ICCPR (which, after all, reflect
general customary international law) apply to places under effective U.S.
control outside the territory of the U.S., 19 or whether other possibilities exist
for enforcement of ICCPR duties outside the Human Rights Committee,
including use of the convention by U.S. courts in construing a statute under
the Charming Betsy canon of construction, in other international fora, or in
foreign courts.
Relevant obligations in OAS human rights instruments and the
Refugee Convention are scarcely mentioned in this or other memoranda;
there is no consideration of whether these instruments might suggest a
broader conception of what constitutes banned torture or inhuman treatment
and no discussion of whether these instruments might have extraterritorial
17 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Def., Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the
Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Consid-
erations (Apr. 4, 2003), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 286, 336 [hereinafter
Memo 26].
18 Memo 25, supra note 1, at 243.
19 The Working Group Report, Memo 25, supra note 1, does not address authorities that
find that the rights in the ICCPR apply extraterritorially or during wartime. Cf. Legal Conse-
quences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opin-
ion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, paras. 102-13 (July 9) (concluding that obligations under the ICCPR,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child apply to occupied territory); Human Rights Committee, General
Comment No. 31, para. 10, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), http://www.unhchr.
ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CCPR.C.21.Rev.1.Add.13.En?Opendocument [hereinafter General
Comment 31] (interpreting ICCPR to extend to "those within the power or effective control
of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory").
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effects and therefore impose duties on the United States when it acts abroad
or on the high seas. There is also no consideration of whether the selection
of detainees who would be subject to particularly aggressive forms of inter-
rogation might implicate U.S. duties not to discriminate on the basis of re-
ligion or nationality under the International Convention on the Elimination
of all Forms of Racial Discrimination ("Convention Against All Forms of
Race Discrimination").2 °
But if the memoranda err mostly through omission with respect to
U.S. treaty obligations, these sins pale in significance to the violence com-
mitted upon the Torture Convention. The Working Group Reports and the
relevant Yoo/Bybee memoranda transmute the Convention Against Torture
into the convention for certain kinds of torture and inhuman treatment, at
least when it comes to actions taken outside U.S. territory.
The relevant memoranda contend that U.S. criminal law on point, as
well as the U.S. "understandings" attached to the definition of torture in
Article 1 of the Torture Convention, confirms what they assert is the plain
meaning of the treaty: namely that it prohibits only the most extreme forms
of intentionally inflicted harm, namely those causing the most severe kind
of physical pain tantamount to death or organ failure or psychological forms
of pressure that cause permanent or prolonged mental harm, and that this
narrow ban applies only when interrogators specifically intend such harms
but not when, for example, they are seeking information to defend the na-
tion from harm. 21 The memoranda contend that the ban on even the most
severe forms of harm, that is on acts that satisfy their narrow definition of
torture, is subject to the defenses of necessity and self-defense and can be,
in any case, countermanded by the President acting as Commander-in-
Chief. The Torture Convention's injunctions against cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment are dismissed on the grounds of the U.S. reservation
that equates these with U.S. constitutional strictures. Since these constitu-
tional constraints, which are seen as limited to the due process clauses of the
U.S. Constitution, are said not to apply to aliens outside the United States,
20 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art.
1, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (banning discrimination on the basis
of, among other things, national or ethnic origin). Compare, for example, the discussion in
the Altstoetter case of the "discriminatory nature" of German laws and policies, including the
Night and Fog decree, as forming a pattern or plan of racial persecution. United States v.
Altstoetter (The Justice Case), in 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL CouNciL LAW NO. 10 1063-81 (1951) [hereinafter
Altstoetter]. See also Parry, supra note 8, at 255-57 (discussing the impact of race on police
enforcement within the United States).
21 See Memo 14, supra note 9, at 172. See also Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy
Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the Presi-
dent (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 218 [hereinafter Memo
151; Memo 25, supra note 1, at 241; Memo 26, supra note 17.
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the result is that the Torture Convention, in the view of the memoranda
writers, does nothing to preclude torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment at least when the U.S. acts against aliens abroad.22 All of these
contentions are belied by the text, context, and negotiating history of this
treaty and the last, as noted below, is at best an unduly narrow construction
of the U.S. Constitution itself.
As even the Executive was compelled to acknowledge after Abu
Ghraib, prohibited torture need not require the severity of pain or mental
harm described in these memoranda.2 3 Moreover, any reading of the "spe-
cific intent" language included in the U.S. understandings to the Torture
Convention or its criminal statute as permitting a criminal prosecution only
in the rare case of a Marquis de Sade driven only by the desire to inflict the
most severe form of pain would suggest that the U.S. never really adhered
to the Torture Convention as it was understood by all. It is also probable
that most of the world would regard such a purported modification of the
treaty's terms as totally at odds with its object and purpose, which was de-
signed after all precisely to prevent torture and inhumane, degrading treat-
ment when seeking information in the course of interrogations.2 4 The ex-
cuses asserted in these memoranda-self-defense, necessity, Presidential
22 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 13, at 652, n.46 (discussing the interpretation of the torture
memoranda by a Justice Department lawyer). But cf Torture by Proxy, supra note 9, at 47-
48 (discussing possibility that the Torture Convention was intended to apply to all territory
under military occupation as well as to any other territory over which a state has "factual
control" and noting that the United States did not make a formal reservation to the Torture
Convention's territorial scope).
23 Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice, to James B. Comey, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal Stan-
dards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://
www.justice.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf [hereinafter Comey Memo]. For a more detailed critique
of the Bybee/Yoo memorandum's treatment of the severity of physical or mental pain needed
to constitute "torture," see, e.g., Linda M. Keller, Is Truth Serum Torture?, 20 AM. U. INT'L
L. REv. 521, 572- 588 (2005).
24 See Memo 14, supra note 9, at 174, 175 ("[I]nfliction of such pain must be the defen-
dant's precise objective.") ("[E]ven if the defendant knows that severe pain will result from
his actions, if causing such harm is not his objective, he lacks the requisite specific intent
even though the defendant did not act in good faith."). The memoranda ignore the complex
law relating to permissible treaty reservations. The memoranda wrongly conflate "under-
standings" with "reservations" that are intended to modify the terms of a treaty and are noti-
fied as such to all treaty parties. See Memo 14, supra note 9, at 184 n. 7 (suggesting that the
U.S. "understanding" to Article 1 of the Torture Convention "represents a modification of
the obligations undertaken by the United States"). Although the U.S. understandings to Arti-
cle 1 of the Torture Convention are extensively discussed and relied upon, the Human Rights
Committee's position regarding reservations that reduce the meaning of a treaty to whatever
the reserving state or its courts believes national law means from time to time is not dis-
cussed, nor is its position with respect to reservations that violate the object and purpose of a
treaty. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2 1/Rev
.l/Add.6 (1994).
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war powers-ignore the absolute nature of the ban on torture in the Torture
Convention's Article 2,25 as well as the legitimate scope of self-defense and
necessity under international law.26
Although the question presented to the authors of these memoranda
is a general one, namely the "standards of conduct" applicable to custodial
interrogations under the law, including treaty law, the Yoo/Bybee
memoranda focus almost entirely on the prospect of criminal prosecutions
under U.S. federal and military law. Driven by an apparent need to reassure
U.S. officials that they need not fear being criminally prosecuted so long as
they stop short of causing death or serious organ damage (and possibly not
even then should the President pen a directive to the contrary), the
memoranda writers transform the Torture Convention's Article 16-which
requires states to prevent other acts of cruel, inhumane or degrading
treatment but does not require such behavior to be criminalized or to result
in civil penalties-into a license to commit cruel, inhumane or degrading
acts on detainees because these are not, in their view, criminal torture.27
Having defined away a great deal of heinous acts because these are not
"torture" narrowly defined, the memoranda authors conveniently do not
dwell on the other onerous duties imposed under the rest of the treaty. Thus
memoranda that are supposedly meant to consider all the legal constraints
on interrogating suspects manage to ignore what it means for the U.S. to
have an international treaty obligation to take "effective legislative,
administrative, judicial" measures to prevent torture (Article 2);28 not to
expel, return or extradite persons to places where they might be tortured
(Article 3);29 to criminalize not just acts of torture but the attempts and
complicity (Article 4);30 to establish jurisdiction over such criminal acts in
any territory under its jurisdiction (Article 5);31 to prosecute or extradite
25 Article 2(2): "No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as
a justification for torture." Torture Convention, supra note 14, art. 2(2).
26 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (permitting treaty interpreters to consider
"relevant rules of international law" along with treaty context). See infra note 28 for discus-
sion of these defenses under international criminal law.
27 See, e.g., Memo 14, supra note 9, at 185 (arguing that the distinction made in Article
16, which reserves the stigma of criminalization to acts of torture, "makes clear that torture is
at the farthest end of impermissible actions" as distinct from cruel, inhumane or degrading
treatment. This fails to mention that Geneva IV, although it stops short of requiring criminal
or civil liability, still requires states to prevent all such acts under Articles 10-13).
28 Torture Convention, supra note 14, art. 2.
29 Id. art. 3.
'0 Id. art. 4.
31 Id. art. 5.
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alien torturers in its territory (Articles 6-7);32 to assist other states in their
criminal prosecutions of torturers (Article 9);33 to prevent acts of torture
through the training of all civil and military personnel (Article 10); 3 4 to
keep interrogation rules under systematic review (Article 11); 35 to conduct
prompt, impartial investigations whenever there are reasonable grounds to
believe torture has been committed (Article 12);36 to provide a prompt,
impartial civil remedy to torture victims (Articles 13-14); 37 or to ban the use
of statements made in the course of torture (Article 15). 38 Questions such as
whether these treaty duties ought to inform the scope of existing U.S. law,
much less whether existing U.S. laws and policies fully implement the
treaty, are deemed beneath notice. The memoranda also say little about the
risks of civil liability under international law either to the nation or the
perpetrator should any of these additional duties be breached. 39 And while
one of the most detailed memorandum on point, Bybee's of August 1, 2002,
purports to address relevant "international decisions" such as those rendered
by the European Court of Human Rights, the few non-U.S. precedents
mentioned are carefully chosen and selectively cited only to reflect the
author's conclusion concerning the severity of pain needed to constitute
torture.4° In this respect, as in most others, these memoranda are advocacy
32 Id. arts. 6-7.
3 Id. art. 9.
14 Id. art. 10.
3" Id. art. 11.
36 Id. art. 12.
31 Id. arts. 13-14.
38 Id. art. 15. The memoranda focus almost entirely on U.S. law and U.S. remedies when
addressing these issues, as if the treaty's express terms are irrelevant even for purposes of
interpreting U.S. law. Thus, although one memorandum extensively addresses the possible
use of involuntary detainee statements, the discussion is cast entirely in terms of U.S. case
law. See, e.g., Memo 26, supra note 17, at 335-336 (ignoring the categorical terms of Article
15 of the Torture Convention: "any statement which is established to have been made as a
result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceeding," and how that provision
has been interpreted by international authorities).
39 See, e.g., Memo 25, supra note 1, at 267-276 (addressing the prospects for civil liability
under U.S. law, such as the ATCA and TVPA, as well as the Eighth, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, but denigrating the prospects for successful suit in U.S. courts); see also Com-
plaint for Declaratory Relief and Damages, Ali v. Rumsfeld, No. 1:05-CV-1201 (N.D. Ill.
2005), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/lawsuit/PDF/rums-complain
t-022805.pdf (alleging that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld violated, among other things, the
Torture Convention by expressly or tacitly authorizing unlawful conduct and failing to stop
the abuse); cf Paust, supra note 13, at 852-855.
40 See Memo 14, supra note 9, at 199 (citing non-U.S. precedents Ireland v. United King-
dom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978) and HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in
Israel v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 46(2) 150). These cases are astonishingly read to "permit, under
international law, an aggressive interpretation as to what amounts to torture, leaving that
label to be applied only where extreme circumstances exist." Memo 14, supra note 9, at 199.
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briefs by "can do" lawyers but certainly not objective examinations of the
current treaty obligations of the United States.
III. TORTURING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF LAW, AND JUS COGENS
But if the torture memoranda's treatment of relevant treaties is
shoddy and incomplete, this does not begin to describe the cavalier, even
reckless, treatment accorded to other sources of international law. The tor-
ture memoranda blithely conclude that customary international law simply
cannot bind the executive or the U.S. military because it is "not federal
law.",4' They also contend that the President's decision "concerning the de-
tention of Al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners constitutes a "controlling" Ex-
ecutive act" that completely overrides any customary international law."
4 2
While both propositions are contestable and seemingly at odds with relevant
Supreme Court precedents, including arguably The Paquete Habana itself,
one would never know this from the memoranda themselves. 43 The memo-
Even if these were plausible readings of these judgments, the conclusion reached is hardly
representative of relevant "international decisions" on point. Not cited are later decisions by
the European Court of Human Rights, such as Aksoy v. Turkey, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260 (1996);
T & V v. United Kingdom, Judgment of Dec. 16, 1999, 30 E.H.R.R. 121, 71 (2000), deci-
sions rendered under ad hoc war crimes tribunals such as Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No.
IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, 497 (Feb. 22, 2001), or a multitude of other
international sources that condemn many specific kinds of interrogation techniques because
they constitute either torture or inhumane treatment. See also U.N. Eco. & Soc. Council
[ECOSOC], Comm. On Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, attached to U.N. Doc.
A/59/324 (Sept. 1, 2004) (prepared by Theo van Boven) [hereinafter Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Torture] (noting that the jurisprudence of both international and regional
human rights mechanisms is unanimous in condemning interrogation methods such as hold-
ing detainees in painful and/or stressful positions, depriving them of sleep and light for pro-
longed periods, exposing them to extremes of heat, cold, noise and light, hooding, depriving
them of clothing, or stripping detainees naked and threatening them with dogs).
41 See Memo 25, supra note 1, at 243; Memo 4, supra note 15, at 71-76; Memo 6, supra
note 15, at 112-16.
42 Memo 6, supra note 15, at 112-116; see also Memo 25, supra note 1, at 243.
43 See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). The famous passage in that judg-
ment "where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision," has been interpreted either as stating that customary international law necessarily
gives way to a "controlling executive act," or as merely stating that customary international
law exists as U.S. federal law even when no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision has previously recognized the custom in question. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §111, cmt. 3 (1987) ("[T]he modem
view is that customary international law in the United States is federal law."); cf Memo 6,
supra note 15, at 112 (concluding that the view that customary international law is federal
law is "seriously mistaken"); cf id. at 116 (stating that the "legitimacy of incorporating cus-
tomary international law as federal law has been subjected to... crippling doubts"); but see
Memo 6, supra note 15 (mentioning the controversy over the status of customary interna-
[Vol. 37:175
TORTURING THE LAW
randa elevate a one-sided, strongly contested revisionist conception of the
status of international law in U.S. law, advocated by some U.S. scholars,
into the status of hornbook law. 44 Moreover, even if the President's deter-
minations that Geneva law does not apply to Al Qaeda and Taliban detain-
ees were deemed "controlling" for purposes of U.S. courts, this says nothing
about the rights of others originally detained far from Afghanistan but later
transported there, to Guantdnamo, or to secret detention locations around
the globe. They too, after all, are detainees in the U.S.'s self-proclaimed
"global war on terror." The memoranda say nothing about whether the
President should be deemed to have silently overridden all relevant rights
under international law for all non-U.S. nationals around the globe, includ-
ing the jus cogens right of all human beings not to be tortured, much less
about whether he could, constitutionally, much less under international law,
trump such a fundamental norm.45
This dismissal of non-treaty sources allows the memoranda's au-
thors to ignore considerable evidence of what constitutes torture as well as
degrading treatment under customary law that is at odds with their restric-
tive interpretation of the "plain meaning" of the Torture Convention.46 It
means that these memoranda dismiss the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, relevant General Assembly resolutions, and influential treaties that
tional law and citing in a footnote the titles of some of the law review articles that respond to
articles by Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith (which affirm that customary international law
ought not be seen as federal law) the substantive arguments in favor of the traditional posi-
tion that customary law is federal law are ignored. The memorandum is written as a brief in
favor of the controversial Bradley-Goldsmith position and not as a balanced presentation of
the opposing arguments that would be presented to a court should the question be raised.) Cf.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 175 U.S. 677, 692 (2004) (affirming that customary international
law has some standing as federal law).
44 Indeed, the memorandum that addresses customary international law in the greatest
detail cites its author's own scholarship in support of its revisionist views of that law. See
Memo 4, supra note 15, at 72 n. 116 (citing in support Professor John Yoo's own scholar-
ship).
45 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
115 n. 3 (noting that there is "some authority" for the proposition that the President may be
able to violate customary international law but also noting the possibility that a U.S. court
would dismiss the issue as a "political question"). There is a serious question whether, con-
sistent with the canon of interpretation requiring U.S. law to be read, if possible, not to vio-
late international law, an ambiguous Presidential order would be read by a court as having
such effects, particularly with respect to ajus cogens norm.
46 See, e.g., Resolution of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 59/182, 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/182 (Mar. 8, 2004) (condemn-
ing "all forms of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment . . . including
through intimidation, which are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever and can thus never be justified" and condemning "any action or attempt by States
or public officials to legalize or authorize ... [such conduct] under any circumstances, in-
cluding on grounds of national security").
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the United States has not ratified such as the American Convention on Hu-
man Rights or the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, as
simply "not binding on the United States" and only "instruments [that] may
inform the views of other nations. 47
Because the memoranda's writers relegate all non-treaty based
sources of international obligation to the non-legal realm, they do not treat
seriously the prospect that, whatever is the case with respect to the jurisdic-
tional scope of some human rights treaties, the customary prohibitions on
torture and inhumane treatment, along with norms ofjus cogens, apply to all
human beings irrespective of where they are located. Their trashing of cus-
tomary law also renders it unnecessary for the torture authors to consider
whether the U.S. reservations to the Torture Convention on which they rely,
even if correctly interpreted, can trump a prohibition that everyone, includ-
ing our courts, agrees is non-derogable as a matter of both customary and
treaty law.48
Although the discussion of customary international law in these
memoranda is limited to its status as federal law and its possible use as a
cause of action in U.S. federal courts, even this discussion is tortuously con-
stricted. Other than a brief footnote mentioning but denigrating the signifi-
cance of the Charming Betsy rule, 49 the most extensive discussion of cus-
tomary international law in these memoranda fails to consider the role of
custom in the construction of treaty obligations of the United States or U.S.
federal law, whether the criminal statute on torture or the Torture Victim
Protection Act ("TVPA"), much less the special status ofjus cogens.
The torture memoranda also do not engage in any significant dis-
cussion of the consequences of U.S. breaches of customary law orjus co-
gens, other than possible actions in U.S. courts. The memoranda scarcely
mention, much less highlight, the basic fact that neither U.S. federal or con-
stitutional law, nor executive determinations, can excuse a violation of in-
47 Memo 26, supra note 17, at 338; see also Memo 6, supra note 15, at 102 (noting that
the question of whether the President can suspend Geneva rights under international law "has
no bearing on domestic constitutional issues, or on the application of the [War Crimes Act]"
but is worth considering "as a means of justifying the actions of the United States in the
world of international politics"). These memoranda fail to recognize that many concepts in
the First Protocol merely codify previously accepted rules of customary international law that
are binding on the United States irrespective of its failure to ratify that instrument.
48 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 4 (ban on torture is not derogable).
49 Memo 6, supra note 15, at 115, n. 129 (contending that the Charming Betsy articulates a
rule of judicial restraint that does not apply international law of its own force but compels the
political branches to clearly state their intention to violate the law). Cf Ralph G. Steinhardt,
The Role of International Law As a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L.
REv. 1103 (1990) (canvassing U.S. precedents applying the Charming Betsy rule in a variety
of contexts to further a number of goals).
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ternational law. 50 They do not point out that breaches of non-treaty sources
of international law have potential consequences for the United States in
terms of its own ability to rely on these norms (as for its own citizens de-
tained elsewhere), the evolving interpretation of these customary laws for
all states should U.S. interpretations prove persuasive to others, and the
nation's ability to rely on these sources for other purposes. The underlying
rules of state responsibility are not mentioned. There is therefore no discus-
sion that a breach of these non-treaty sources of international law triggers
the international liability of the U.S. no less than any treaty breach, no con-
sideration of potential adverse consequences through denials of reciprocal
treatment outside the context of the Geneva Conventions, countermeasures
by other states, or adjudication in the International Court of Justice ("ICJ")
or other nations' courts. And although several of the memoranda purport to
address the "historical, policy and operational considerations" and not
merely the legal concerns with respect to detainee interrogations in the
global war on terror,51 even these do not address the indelible links between
the erga omnes obligations imposed on states precluding torture and inhu-
mane treatment and the historic U.S. commitment to promoting universal,
fundamental, and inalienable rights to human dignity. Nothing is said about
why states, including the United States, believed it to be important to under-
take such strenuous efforts over so many years to make the prohibition on
torture non-derogable, such that it cannot be overridden, expressly or by
implication by, for example, an agreement to transfer suspects between the
United States and other countries. Indeed, the most detailed memorandum
on the subject of applicable legal standards for interrogation acknowledges,
at the outset, that "other nations and international bodies may take a more
restrictive view," but relegates such views to second-order considerations of
"policy. ' 52 Thus, while the torture memoranda spend considerable time
discussing the ostensible rationales of relevant U.S. laws, such as the War
Crimes Act,53 the rationales of non-treaty sources of international obligation
are almost entirely ignored. Readers are left with the impression that these
non-treaty sources are illegitimate rules suggested by others that have
somehow emerged contrary to the will or national interests of the United
States.
IV. TORTURING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
Since the torture memoranda dismiss the relevance of the Geneva
Conventions and customary international law, they address only the precise
50 See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 27.
51 See Memo 25, supra note 1, at 241; see also Memo 26, supra note 17, at 286.
52 Memo 25, supra note 1, at 241.
" 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000).
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federal crimes codified in the U.S. War Crimes Act. The memoranda men-
tion only in passing that violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and inhumane treatment of certain detainees are war crimes,
under both customary and treaty law. Violations may subject perpetrators to
criminal liability before the International Criminal Court ("ICC") or in a
national court outside the U.S. that respects some forms of extraterritorial
jurisdiction or universal jurisdiction for such crimes.54 The memoranda
spend a great deal of time addressing alleged defenses to war crimes
charges under both U.S. and international law, but devote almost no atten-
tion to the substantive standards that govern criminal liability under interna-
tional law, even though these standards might be applied by U.S. courts and
are surely likely to be invoked should U.S. personnel, contractors or agents
ever be charged outside of the United States. Relevant international stan-
dards for determining what constitutes "aiding or abetting," or "conspiracy"
to commit torture are ignored, even while the memoranda writers reassure
the executive that Article 98 bilateral agreements excluding U.S. nationals
from the jurisdiction of the ICC are being negotiated "with as many coun-
tries as possible." 55 In light of numerous and serious allegations that U.S.
officials may be "outsourcing" torture to private contractors or other gov-
ernments and may even be sitting in on such sessions abroad, one would
expect that 50-100 page memoranda written to advise the Executive Branch
would find some room for serious consideration of what constitutes the ac-
tus reus and mens rea that might trigger international criminal liability, in-
cluding as accomplices or aiders or abetters, especially when others act at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of U.S. government or
military officials.
56
54 See, e.g., Memo 26, supra note 17, at 339.
55 Id. This memorandum does not mention that the legality of these agreements is con-
tested.
56 Cf. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, supra note 40, 15 (noting that all
such acts engage the state's responsibility) and 19 (discussing responsibility for the acts of
private contractors). See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1 -T, Judgment,
207 (Dec. 10, 1998) (finding that mere presence that encourages perpetrators of torture may
constitute "complicity in a crime against humanity"). For a more thorough discussion of U.S.
and international law regarding attempts, conspiracy, and aiding and abetting as these pertain
to "extraordinary renditions," see Torture by Proxy, supra note 9, at 44-46, 48-49, 71-73. For
a general discussion of relevant international precedents on what constitutes complicity un-
der international law, see., e.g., Andrew Clapham, On Complicity, in LE DROIT PtNAL A
L'tPREUVE DE L'INTERNATIONALISATION 241 (Marc Henzelin & Robert Roth eds., 2002). Cf.
Text of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Arti-
cles of Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts] (defining aid or assistance
in the commission of an internationally wrongful act).
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Perhaps less surprisingly, the memoranda also do not address the
potential criminal liability of government lawyers such as the memoranda
writers themselves. Readers of these memoranda are not informed of certain
disturbing historical parallels between some of the arguments being pre-
sented and those made by high government officials and lawyers in Nazi
Germany. At the end of World War II, the U.S. was instrumental in convict-
ing Nazi leaders who had argued that the traditional customary norms gov-
erning the rules of war were "obsolete" with respect to the Soviets since
they were a new kind of unconventional and "barbaric" "terrorist" adversary
requiring a new (as yet undefined) legal paradigm. 57
Insofar as these memoranda imply that those facing the possibility
of criminal convictions can avoid such charges on the basis of self-defense,
necessity, or because their Commander-in-Chief ordered them to defend the
nation against terrorism, these contentions torture beyond recognition rele-
vant defenses under international criminal law. Whatever may be the case
under In re Neagle,58 a 1890 U.S. Supreme Court case on which the memo-
randa writers rely, the premise that a government official charged with a
war crime can claim that he was acting pursuant to "self-defense" because
he was protecting not himself or another individual but the "United States
Government," 59 is a perversion of both pre- and post-Nuremberg law. The
57 Scott Horton, Through a Mirror, Darkly: Applying the Geneva Conventions to "A New
Kind of Warfare," in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 136, 145-146 (Karen Greenberg ed.,
2005) (summarizing the rationales offered by Nazi officials for evading, in connection with
the Eastern front, then-existing international humanitarian law as the following: (1) because
the Soviets were "barbaric" enemies engaged in non-conventional "terrorist" practices; (2)
because such persons were not entitled to either the substantive or procedural protections of
international humanitarian law; (3) because the relevant laws of war were "obsolete" and ill-
suited to this kind of ideologically driven warfare; (4) because Germany's enemies would not
reciprocally apply the law; (5) because construction of international law should be driven in
the first instance by a "clear understanding of the national interest as determined by the ex-
ecutive;" and (6) because the rules of international law were subordinate to the military inter-
ests of Germany as determined by the German Fuhrer. Cf Memo 7, supra note 12, at 119
(arguing that terrorism requires a "new kind of war" and that this "new paradigm renders
obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners"). While some schol-
ars have suggested that the post 9/11 "war" on terror constitutes a relatively new phenome-
non requiring "adjustments" in both domestic and international rules, those sensitive to at-
tendant risks are also quick to affirm that some irreducible principles should not in any case
be broached, such as the rule "that those who execute the law must never be the sole and
final arbiters of that law." Thomas M. Franck, Criminals, Combatants, or What? An Exami-
nation of the Role of Law in Responding to the Threat of Terror, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 686, 688
(2004) (emphasis in original).
58 In reNeagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
59 Memo 25, supra note 1, at 263 (asserting that "any conduct that arguably violated a
criminal prohibition ... [is subject to] more than just individual self-defense or defense of
another" and is also subject to a defense that the individual was "fulfilling the Executive
Branch's authority to protect the federal government, and the nation, from attack").
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invocation of individual or collective self-defense is not a defense to grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, which is, after all, law that presumes
the existence of two warring parties, each convinced that it is defending
itself against the other. 60 It is also not a cognizable defense to the crime of
torture as required by the Torture Convention or as foreseen by other human
rights instruments, such as the ICCPR. 61 Article 2 of the Torture Conven-
tion, for example, does not say that government officials or military person-
nel can torture whenever there is a public emergency, crisis or threat to the
nation. 62 It states the opposite.
63
While an individual facing duress might conceivably have a defense
to a war crime or may use such personal circumstances to mitigate punish-
ment,64 neither the ad hoc war crimes tribunals nor the ICC includes a de-
fense of self-defense based on a threat to governmental interests; indeed not
including such a defense is one of the principal rationales for making the
ban on torture non-derogable. The idea that self-defense is a defense to a
war crimes charge confuses the rules governingjus in bello with those gov-
erning jus ad bellum. Self-defense, in international law, operates only as a
defense for states that engage in the use of force.65
The memoranda create, from whole cloth, a defense of "necessity"
from the "choice of evils" provision in the U.S. Model Penal Code.6 6 They
do not indicate that such a defense is not possible under the categorical
terms of the Torture Convention nor under the statutes of the ad hoc war
crimes tribunals or the ICC, all of which the United States was instrumental
60 See, e.g., Torture by Proxy, supra note 9, at 79-82 (discussing the non-derogability of
torture under the Torture Convention and Geneva law).
61 Id. at 78-79.
62 See Torture Convention, supra note 14, art. 2.
63 See id.
6 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22, Sentencing Appeal (Oct. 7,
1997) (explaining that duress is not a complete defense but can mitigate punishment). But see
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Cassese (Oct. 7, 1997) (asserting that duress can constitute a defense). See also Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court art. 31, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter
Rome Statute] (stating that duress is included as grounds for excluding criminal responsibil-
ity). Note that the wording of Article 31 makes clear that the concept of duress is limited to
circumstances resulting from a threat of imminent death or serious bodily harm against a
person, and not against a nation or governmental interests. Id.
65 As the memoranda acknowledge, this is a defense at the interstate level under Article 51
of the UN Charter. See Memo 25, supra note 1, at 264, n.24; see also Torture by Proxy,
supra note 9, at 78-79 (stating that such a defense might be relevant in the context of a war
crimes trial of an individual where the charge was, as at Nuremberg, waging a crime against
peace or a crime of aggression). As is well known, the international community is still strug-
gling with a modem definition of the crime of aggression and that crime is not yet included
as a possible charge before any international war crimes tribunal.
66 See, e.g., Memo 25, supra note 1, at 260-61.
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in drafting. International law does not contemplate that there is a "greater"
evil that torture is intended to preclude. Indeed, an analogous defense, based
on the premise that the acts committed by government officials were alleg-
edly a "lesser evil," was repeatedly rejected at Nuremberg and subsequent
occupation trials.67
The memoranda also fail to consider the single instance in which
necessity as a defense exists in international law, namely as a possible de-
fense to state responsibility. Even for this purpose, which impacts state dis-
cretion to a much lesser extent than criminal charges brought against its
highest officials, the burdens imposed on states claiming such an affirmative
defense are steep. As recently codified by the International Law Commis-
sion ("ILC"), a state may invoke necessity as a ground precluding wrong-
fulness if, among other things, the act taken "is the only [means] for the
State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent
peril."68 Even assuming that necessity were somehow extrapolated to pro-
vide a defense to international crimes, it is difficult to see how the United
States, or any state, would be able to meet a burden that requires it to show
that torturing a suspect was the "only" way that a state had at its disposal to
deal with an on-going or imminent threat. 69 In addition, as the ILC's rules
67 See, e.g., Altstoetter, supra note 20, at 1086 (rejecting Schlegelberger's defense that his
actions prevented graver violations of the fair administration of justice).
68 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 56, art.
25 (addressing the liability of governments to each other under customary international law
for violations of international law). These Articles do not address the criminal liability of
individuals under international criminal law.
69 See Florian Jessberger, Bad Torture- Good Torture?, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1059 (2005)
(discussing a German court decision involving the threat of torture against a kidnapper in an
effort to save the kidnap victim where the court found the two police officers involved
"guilty, but not to be punished"); Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic
Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 MiNN. L. REv. 1481, 1502-1503 (2004) (enumerat-
ing some of the evidentiary difficulties presented in the familiar "ticking bomb scenario").
As the Jessberger and Gross articles indicate, consideration of "necessity" in the mitigation
of a sentence ordered against a convicted torturer envisions a case-specific and post-hoc
determination that the particular action taken by the official actor was in fact "necessary." It
requires that the official asserting necessity have specific knowledge that the detainee before
him or her has direct knowledge of a specific imminent attack or threat to innocent life. The
torture memoranda so not limit themselves to such "ticking time" scenarios; on the contrary,
some of the memoranda address a broad range of situations, including questioning for mili-
tary operations and intelligence information, "interrogations for criminal law enforcement,"
"interrogations by investigative services of one of the U.S. Armed Forces investigating war
crimes," and "interrogations with mixed or dual purposes." See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay
S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to William J. Haynes, II, Gen.
Counsel, Dep't of Def., Potential Legal Constraints Applicable to Interrogations of Persons
Captured by U.S. Armed Forces in Afghanistan (Feb. 26, 2002), reprinted in TORTURE
PAPERS, supra note 1, at 153, 161, 163, 165 [hereinafter Memo 13]. The memoranda also do
not clarify whether the proposed defenses of necessity, self-defense, or Presidential approval
would apply in all of these contexts or only to some of them. If news reports are accurate,
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of state responsibility make clear, even a successful plea of necessity does
not automatically excuse the state from paying compensation "for any mate-
rial loss caused by the act in question., 70 Providing for compensation
mechanisms for torture victims is, as noted, a requirement of the Torture
Convention. 71
The torture memoranda undermine settled post-Nuremberg law
concerning superior orders in two ways. The memoranda acknowledge, as
they must, that following orders is not a defense but may be considered only
in the mitigation of punishment.72 Nonetheless, the memoranda writers con-
tend that U.S. executive officials ought not to be prosecuted for interroga-
tions that merely carry out the President's Commander-in-Chief powers and
that U.S. laws, including criminal laws, ought to be interpreted to avoid
constitutional problems such as interference with the President's conduct of
war.73 When this is combined with the writers' expansive views of the
President's powers in this respect, this sends a clear message that at least
when the President issues a written directive authorizing certain methods of
interrogation, his determination provides complete protection from criminal
prosecution. 4
Following orders is also turned from a consideration that might
mitigate punishment on a case by case basis into an absolute defense from
criminal liability in a second, more subtle way. Having spent considerable
time re-defining torture so that many interrogation techniques no longer
qualify as patently unlawful, the memoranda's most extensive treatment of
the superior orders defense begins by noting that "[u]nder both international
law and U.S. law, an order to commit an obviously criminal act, such as the
wanton killing of a noncombatant or the torture of a prisoner, is an unlawful
order that will not relieve a subordinate of his responsibility to comply with
the law of armed conflict., 75 That memorandum goes on to stress that such
orders must outrage fundamental concepts of justice for these to be legiti-
U.S. interrogators have adopted policies involving physical coercion against large numbers
of detainees going far beyond those who might credibly be said to have had knowledge of
specific imminent attacks. But as one critic has noted, if it is to be justified on the basis of
necessity, torture must be the exception, not the norm. Parry, supra note 8, at 259.
70 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 27(b), supra note 68.
71 Torture Convention, supra note 14, art. 14(1).
72 See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
73 See, e.g., Memo 14, supra note 9, at 202-204.
74 As Harold Koh indicates, these contentions assert unwarranted claims for complete
immunity for executive officials and for a following orders defense for those in the chain of
command. Koh, supra note 13, at 651. Cf Torture by Proxy, supra note 9, at 28-29 (suggest-
ing that the "take care" clause would bar the President from concluding international agree-
ments that would permit or aid torture).
75 Memo 25, supra note I, at 265 (emphasis in original).
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mately disobeyed and emphasizes that an individual that obeys an order that
he does not know is unlawful has a complete defense.76 But since the
memoranda themselves have strongly implied that many interrogation tech-
niques short of those causing the most intensive physical pain do not offend
fundamental precepts of justice, the stage is set for the memoranda's pre-
sumption that U.S. interrogation orders will never be patently unlawful. The
sections of these memoranda addressing superior orders conclude, therefore,
not with the usual negative injunction (superior orders are generally not a
defense) but with the opposite, more positive spin: "the defense of superior
orders will generally be available for U.S. Armed Forces personnel engaged
in exceptional interrogations except where the conduct goes so far as to be
patently unlawful." 7
The defenses to criminal accountability envisioned in these memo-
randa would, in short, render the category of "war crimes" into essentially
an empty set.
The torture memoranda mangle more than just international law.
Others have ably demonstrated the number of ways that these documents
offer only a cramped view of relevant guarantees in the U.S. Constitution,
such that the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment only applies to
those convicted of crimes and does not apply to pre-conviction custodial
interrogations; 78 constitutional guarantees of due process, which are cate-
gorically stated not to apply either to nonresident enemy aliens outside the
territory of the United States or unlawful combatants such as those held in
Guantinamo, 79 and foundational principles of checks and balances and
separation of powers, which are bypassed through an expansive, lawless re-
76 Id.
71 Id. at 266.
78 See, e.g., Memo 25, supra note 1, at 268-271. Cf Keller, supra note 23, at 557- 568
(2005) (noting dicta in Supreme Court cases that imply that the Eighth Amendment extends
to pre-conviction punishment such as torturous interrogation, other cases suggesting that the
Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination might cover interrogations where no
criminal charges are brought, and cases suggesting that coercive interrogation in and of itself
may violate the Fourteenth Amendment's right to substantive due process). To the extent the
torture memoranda writers take a constricted view of the Fifth, Eight or Fourteenth Amend-
ments, this affects their interpretation of the scope of protection against cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment in the Torture Convention since, as they repeatedly stress, the U.S. res-
ervation equates the treaty standard to those in the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Memo 25,
supra note 1, at 269.
79 See, e.g., Memo 25, supra note 1, at 268. Cf. Rasul v. Bush, 124 U.S. 2686, 2698 n.15
(2004) (suggesting that foreign nationals in U.S. custody at Guantinamo Naval Base possess
constitutional rights); See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitu-
tional Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L REv. 2073 (2005) (distinguishing
three distinct approaches to the extraterritorial scope of U.S. constitutional rights derived
from prior Supreme Court judgments).
2006]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
interpretation of the scope of Presidential powers.80 Others, such as Jeremy
Waldron, have argued, persuasively, that the torture memoranda undermine
the rule of law itself 8 t -ironically, the principal policy objective now given
for the U.S. presence in Iraq.
It would be gratifying to say that the Bush Administration's more
recent renunciations of the Yoo-Bybee line of memoranda show that the law
cannot be successfully tortured, but this would be untrue. The Administra-
tion's renunciation of the more extreme positions taken in prior memoranda
appears to stem more from the power of the camera than the vindicating
power of legal truth. It was only after Abu Ghraib photographs seized the
world's attention-and made it impossible for the Administration to claim
no such acts were being committed by its personnel-that it retreated from
some of the more extreme legal arguments made in its own torture memo-
randa. Contrast the Administration's reaction to Abu Ghraib to its continu-
ing defense of the "legal black hole" that is Guantdnamo, which has not
been the subject of incriminating photographs to indicate the tangible harms
of indefinite detention without trial, or the Administration's continued deni-
als, despite considerable reports to the contrary, of comparable inhumane
treatment of detainees elsewhere or of a regular policy of "extraordinary
renditions" to countries that apparently are only too willing to torture on our
behalf.8 2 The Administration's continuing ability to misapply the law of the
U.N. Charter (by ignoring its human rights provisions as well as its bar on
the use of force with respect to Iraq) or to torture the Geneva Conventions
(by ruling it automatically inapplicable to the regular army of Afghanistan
as well as enemy combatants by Presidential fiat without benefit of a timely
80 See, e.g., Memo 14, supra note 9, at 204-207 (contending that any efforts by Congress
to regulate the interrogation of battlefield combatants would be unconstitutional). See also
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Timothy Flanigan, Deputy Counsel to the President, The President's Constitutional Authority
to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25,
2001), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 3 (arguing for an expansive view of
"unreviewable" Presidential power to take any and all military action, including preventive
action, against all terrorist groups whether or not linked to Sept. 11 th). Ironically, another
one of the torture memoranda derives this extraordinary view of Presidential power to take
defensive action precisely from the President's "power under Article II to take care that the
laws are faithfully executed." Memo 25, supra note 1, at 263. Cf Koh, supra note 13, at 648-
56 (offering a very different view of the scope of Presidential powers); Derek Jinks & David
Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 131
(2004); Youngstown Steel & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952); Rasul, 542
U.S. at 486-7. See generally Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Indefinite
Detention of "Enemy Combatants": Balancing Due Process and National Security in the
Context of the War on Terror, Feb. 6, 2004.
81 See Waldron, supra note 11.
82 See generally Torture by Proxy, supra note 9 (providing analysis of the legality of ex-
traordinary rendition under U.S. and international law).
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hearing) suggests that it is possible for "can-do" lawyers to interpret legal
obligations away and get away with it, at least for a time. After all, even the
authors of the most notorious torture memoranda have not been punished,
and some have been rewarded, for torturing the law. 83 Indeed, the Admini-
stration's continuing success in torturing numerous areas of both interna-
tional and national law suggests that its UN ambassador, John Bolton, did
not go far enough when he argued that international law is not really law.
84
It would appear that neither U.S. statutory nor federal law is really binding
law, at least not for a President (or an attorney general) who asserts that any
Congressional attempts to restrain the President's "plenary" power over
military operations, including the treatment of prisoners, would be unconsti-
tutional.85
This is further suggested by the hedged nature of the Administra-
tion's renunciations of some of the prior torture memoranda. The Memo-
randum to Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey of Dec. 30, 2004,
released days before Senate hearings to consider the nomination of Alberto
Gonzales for Attorney General, rectifies only some of the foregoing tortured
interpretations of law. The new Comey memorandum disavows the use of
torture and disagrees with the contention that torture only encompasses ex-
ceptionally severe injury such as organ failure or death.86 It also distin-
guishes "specific intent" from motive, indicating that a motive to protect
national security is not relevant to the question of whether a defendant acted
with requisite specific intent to commit a crime.87 But the new memoran-
dum does not disavow prior legal interpretations of the apparently unlimited
powers of the Commander-in-Chief, stating only that it is "unnecessary" to
consider such claims in light of the new assurances that the U.S. govern-
ment does not engage in torture. 88 Nor does the memorandum revisit the
83 Jay Bybee was appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov (last visited February
28, 2006).
84 John R. Bolton, Is There Really "Law" in International Affairs?, 10 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 48 (2000). Of course, Bolton's position with respect to treaties ignores
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution which accords treaties, along with laws of the
United States, the status of 'the supreme law of the land.' U.S. CONST. art. VI.
85 See, e.g., Memo 4, supra note 15; Memo 25, supra note 1. Cf Bacchus, supra note 1, at
327 (comparing such sentiments to Jefferson's conception that ours was a government of
laws, not of men). This view of untrammeled executive power, at odds with the Supreme
Court's recent judgment in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 589 (2004), for example,
would imply that we are a nation under the rule of one man in particular, namely the Com-
mander-in-Chief.
86 Comey Memo, supra note 23, at 5-15.
87 Id. at 17.
88 Id. at 2. As Diane Amann has noted, the Comey Memo continues to deny that interna-
tional treaties or customary international law may limit the executive's ability to engage in
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scope or meaning of the international and U.S. constitutional ban on cruel
and unusual punishment; indeed, the current U.S. Attorney General contin-
ues to suggest that some forms of cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment
remain permissible during interrogation, at least by the Central Intelligence
Agency ("CIA") and other U.S. personnel when they act outside the terri-
tory of the United States. 
89
V. THE GOLDSMITH MEMORANDUM
The Administration's belated assurances in the Comey memoran-
dum that it does not itself engage in torture also fails to mention the last
memorandum included in The Torture Papers, then Assistant Attorney
General's Jack L. Goldsmith's March 19, 2004 memorandum to top lawyers
at the U.S. Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the CIA as
well as the Legal Adviser for National Security. 90 This memorandum opens
torture or inhumane treatment. Amann, supra note 13, at 2123. At his confirmation hearings
for Attorney General, Gonzales pointedly did not affirm that the President has a duty himself
to enforce and abide by the law, even though, of course, the text of the U.S. Constitution
would appear to indicate precisely that. See Eric Lichtblau, Gonzales Speaks Against Torture
During Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2005, at AI (quoting Gonzales' response to whether he
agreed that the President could ignore the ban on torture: "I guess I would have to say that
hypothetically that authority may exist"). As of this writing, the Administration continues to
resist proposed legislation that would enumerate permissible interrogation methods, ban the
use of torture or cruel inhumane treatment by U.S. agents when acting abroad, or that would
criminalize instances in which U.S. officials abroad transfer individuals to countries that pose
a serious risk of torturing the transferees.
89 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 13, at 652 n.46 (citing Gonzales's January 2005 responses to
the Senate Judiciary Committee). See generally Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and
the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
278 (2003).
90 The Goldsmith memorandum became generally known in late 2004 and it later became
publicly available via the web. See John Crook, Reported Removal of Prisoners from Iraq,
99 AM. J. INT'L L. 265 (2005). Notably, the White House succeeded, in the wake of the
Comey memorandum, in deleting from intelligence reform legislation a measure that "would
have explicitly extended to intelligence officers a prohibition against torture or inhumane
treatment, and would have required the CIA as well as the Pentagon to report to Congress
about the methods they were using." Keller, supra note 23, at 556 (quoting New York Times
report of Jan. 13, 2005). The difficult question of whether the law of armed occupation has
ceased to apply to Iraq after the Interim Government assumed authority on June 30, 2004, in
accordance with S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004) (suggesting that the
end of occupation occurred on that date), lies outside the scope of this essay. It is sufficient
to note that many experts in international humanitarian law, and apparently the United States
Government itself, have argued that while the formal occupation may have ended on June 30,
2004, the U.S.-led multilateral force that, by agreement between the Interim Government and
the United States remains responsible for security, remains subject to the laws of armed
conflict as modified by relevant Security Council resolutions, "including the Geneva Con-
ventions." See id. (Annex) (incorporating a June 5, 2004 letter from then Secretary of State
Powell). See also ADAM ROBERTS, THE END OF OCCUPATION IN IRAQ (2004),
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the door for the United States to remove, permanently, "illegal aliens" from
occupied territories such as Iraq and to transfer, for an unspecified tempo-
rary period, all others, including citizens of occupied territory, to other
countries to "facilitate interrogation." 91 Although identified as a mere
"draft" like several others in The Torture Papers, this memorandum, unlike
some others, has not been renounced by the U.S. government and its legal
conclusions may reflect existing Administration policy.
92
The Goldsmith memorandum has been generally spared the oppro-
brium of the torture memoranda drafted by Bybee or Yoo. 9 3 It is not hard to
see why. Goldsmith avoids contentious claims about the meaning of the
U.S. Bill of Rights, the scope of Presidential powers, or the availability of
general excuses like necessity or self-defense. His memorandum does not
address torture or other forms of coercive interrogation. It is narrowly fo-
cused on the meaning of two words, "deportation" and "transfer," in a sin-
gle sentence in Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohib-
its "individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportation of protected
persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or
to that of any other country, occupied or not, . . . regardless of their mo-
tive."94 Although Goldsmith concludes, contrary to this seemingly un-
equivocal ban, that this does not prevent the permanent deportation of ille-
gal aliens from occupied territory nor the temporary removal of others, in-
http://www.ihlresearch.org/iraq/pdfs/briefing3461.pdf (concluding that the multilateral force
cannot, even after June 30th, deport Iraqi civilians "under any circumstances" consistent with
Article 49 of Geneva IV). Note that to the extent occupation law no longer applies to Iraq,
the multilateral force would presumably still be subject to Iraq's human rights obligations
under treaty as well as customary law.
91 Memo 28, supra note 9, at 366.
92 Cf Comey Memo, supra note 23 (renouncing portions of the prior Bybee/Yoo memo-
randa). It is not uncommon for government attorneys to routinely stamp "draft" on their
opinions, even when these are effectively final. Indeed, there is some evidence that the Gold-
smith memorandum has been given effect. Thus, although then-attorney general nominee (to
whom the Goldsmith memorandum is addressed) noted that this memorandum was never
finalized or signed, by late October 2004, there were press reports that the CIA had trans-
ferred as many as a dozen non-Iraqi prisoners out of Iraq for interrogation elsewhere. Crook,
supra note 90. Whether or not the Goldsmith memorandum was solicited precisely to justify
such transfers, one would have thought, especially given continuing allegations of the secret
transfer of prisoners and detention camps directed at the U.S. or its agents, that once the
Goldsmith memorandum became public the U.S. government would have sought to distance
itself from its conclusions if these did not reflect its existing policies and it was not transfer-
ring protected persons out of Iraq.
93 But see Paust, supra note 13, at 850-851. Indeed, Goldsmith has been lauded in the
press for reportedly resisting the some of the extreme conclusions reached in the prior By-
bee/Yoo torture memoranda and for encouraging the Administration to renounce these in the
Comey Memo. See, e.g., Daniel Klaidman et al., Palace Revolt, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 2006, at
34.
94 Geneva IV, supra note 14, art. 49; Memo 28, supra note 9.
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cluding Iraqi nationals, to "facilitate" interrogation, the basis for these con-
clusions lies, according to the memorandum, in pre-existing customary in-
ternational law as well as the standard rules of treaty interpretation. The
memorandum's erudite fourteen single space pages seem plausible applica-
tions of plain meaning, object and purpose, and context. Unlike Bybee and
Yoo, Goldsmith seems respectful, not contemptuous, of both treaty and cus-
tomary legal sources of obligation.
But appearances can be deceiving. Upon closer inspection, this
memorandum also tortures the law. Indeed, the memorandum is all the more
dangerous because the conclusions reached have such surface appeal and
because they threaten to become, if they have not achieved this status al-
ready, a significant inducement for the outsourcing of torture.
The more plausible of Goldsmith's conclusions is that Article 49
does not preclude the normal application of the occupied state's immigra-
tion laws and therefore the deportation of illegal aliens who, by definition,
have no legal right to remain on occupied territory. But, contrary to Gold-
smith's strenuous efforts to suggest otherwise, nothing in the plain meaning
or object and purpose of the Convention suggests that the categorical ban in
Article 49 was meant to include a sub silentio exception for aliens, whether
legal or illegal. As Goldsmith acknowledges by not addressing the point, the
term "protected persons" in Article 49, as elsewhere in Geneva IV, such as
its Article 35 (which includes enemy aliens in occupied territory as "pro-
tected persons" and recognizes their right to leave voluntarily) presump-
tively includes all civilians who "inhabit" occupied territory, subject to
clearly enumerated exceptions for nationals of the detaining power, of co-
belligerent states, of states that are not parties to Geneva IV, or those who
are "suspected of or engaged in" hostile activities. 95 As is clear from a com-
parison of the Convention's Article 27, which forbids adverse distinctions
based on a number of characteristics but does not include nationality, with
Articles 3 or 13, which forbid adverse distinctions based on, among other
things, place of birth or nationality, the drafters of Geneva IV were well
aware of the need to distinguish aliens from citizens when necessary and
they did not do so in Article 49.96
95 Geneva IV, supra note 14, arts. 4, 5. Indeed, Article 49 itself, in forbidding an occupy-
ing power from "deport[ing] or transfer[ing] parts of its own civilian population into the
territory it occupies," appears to make no distinction between the types of "civilians" being
relocated. Id. art. 49.
96 See also COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION IV OF 1949, RELATIVE TO THE
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIMES OF WAR 40 (ICRC, Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958)
[hereinafter ICRC Commentary] (noting that Article 27's failure to include nationality re-
flects a recognition that certain security measures or administrative procedures may apply
differently to non-citizens but that such "measures and procedures do not affect the treatment
of individuals, which must be humane in all cases").
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Goldsmith's efforts to import an alienage distinction into the term
"deportation" is convincing only if one ignores, as he acknowledges, the
usual use of the term under American law and Black's law dictionary. 97
Contrary to Goldsmith, there is no evidence that the drafters of article 49
ignored its plain meaning and imported only a narrow conception of "depor-
tation" into Geneva IV. A plain meaning analysis does not support Gold-
smith's interpretation and the principal materials available to assist interpre-
tation, including the ICRC's commentary, do not support this limited view
of the term. Although the memorandum cites the ICRC commentary for the
proposition that "deportation" was meant to extend only to "inhabitants,"
the latter term, as Goldsmith also acknowledges, was used "loosely and
interchangeably" to include members of the "population" of occupied terri-
tory. 98 Both the Commentary and relevant Nuremberg decisions use the
term "inhabitants" to embrace all those who inhabit, that is any person who
lives in a particular territory, whether or not they are citizens or legal or
illegal aliens.
And even if Goldsmith were correct about the meaning of "deporta-
tion," he faces a problem in that the article 49 ban extends equally to "forci-
ble transfers" and not merely deportations. As Goldsmith acknowledges, a
basic canon of treaty interpretation urges treaty interpreters not to render
treaty terms superfluous where another meaning might give them effect.
Goldsmith argues, without any direct evidence, that the two terms were in-
tended to be interchangeable and were not intended to provide any addi-
tional rights to protected persons. 99
For these reasons, Goldsmith cannot base his strained interpretation
of "forceful transfers," which literally would appear to apply to anyone who
is involuntarily forced to leave a country, on the plain meaning of Article
49.
What then do we know of the historical context in which Article 49
was negotiated, which, as Goldsmith states, would clarify the object and
purpose of the drafters? Although Goldsmith acknowledges that the prohibi-
tion on deportations from occupied territory has a history that pre-dates the
atrocities of WWII, he dismisses that history in a single paragraph, and fo-
cuses instead on the particular acts of WWII because these "most directly
97 Memo 28, supra note 9, at 368. Goldsmith also fails to mention that the French and
English versions of Geneva IV are equally authoritative. See Geneva IV, supra note 14, art.
150.
9' Id. at 370 n.6.
99 See 2 FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949 664 (1949)
(noting that "in the last war the flower of Italian youth had been sent to Germany in cattle
trucks. Such forced transfers must at all events be prohibited in the future. The term "depor-
tation" in the last paragraph of the Article had better not be used, as "deportation" was some-
thing quite different") (statement by Italian Delegate M. Maresca).
2006]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
inform" the text of Geneva IV. 00 Even assuming that Goldsmith is right
that the negotiators of Geneva IV were narrowly focused on preventing
what the Nazis did in the countries that they had occupied, Goldsmith's
description of what the Nazis did is incomplete. He is correct that the Nazis
tore people from their homes and caused them to disappear into the night,
especially after their notorious Night and Fog decrees. But he is wrong to
suggest that these horrific acts were limited to the nationals of the occupied
territories or that the drafters were only horrified to the extent such acts
were directed at such persons.
Nazi actions directed at people within occupied territories had been
widely publicized by the time Geneva IV was negotiated. The Fog and
Night campaigns and other forced labor practices had gathered international
attention during the Nuremberg trials in which Nazi leaders such as
Wilhelm Keitel publicly admitted complicity in such acts, under which
"whole populations were deported to Germany for the purposes of slave
labour upon defense works, armament production and similar tasks con-
nected to the war effort."'' It was well known that such horrors befell
"whole" populations, including German aliens living in occupied territory,
such as Anne Frank, living in the Netherlands. 102 At the time that the nego-
tiations for Geneva IV were going on, evidence was being heard in Ger-
many in the occupation trial of United States v. Altstoetter. That trial pro-
vided the most extensive coverage of the Nazi's Night and Fog policies,
described as a plan or scheme to combat so-called resistance movements in
occupied territories by enslaving, deporting, and imprisoning many thou-
10o Memo 28, supra note 9, at 369. But see DAvID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF
JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 45-52 (2002) (dis-
cussing the provision outlawing deportations in the Tokyo draft of the Convention for Pro-
tection of Civilians from 1934 and its impact on the draft text of Geneva IV). Kretzmer's
account suggests that it would be wrong to assume that the prohibition in what came to be
Article 49 was solely or primarily tied to Nazi deportations. Of course, even if Goldsmith
and not Kretzmer were correct, Goldsmith cites nothing to indicate that the drafters of Ge-
neva IV intended only to replicate and not to progressively develop the existing rules of
international law.
1O1 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment (Sept. 30, 1946), in CRIMES OF
WAR 96 (Richard A. Falk et al. eds., 1971).
102 Anne Frank's story, describing a forcible transfer of an alien from occupied territory,
had made news by the time Geneva IV was negotiated, as it was first published in a Dutch
newspaper Het Parool in 1946 and as a book, also in Dutch, in 1947. By 1948, more than
10,000 copies of Anne Frank's diary had been published, although it did not appear in Ger-
man and French until 1950 and in English only in 1952. Anne Frank Museum, The Publica-
tion of the Diary, http://www.annefrank.org/content.asp?pid=1 12&lid=2. It is not clear that
anyone focused on whether Anne Frank or her family were legal or illegal aliens under
Dutch law or whether in forcibly transferring them from the Netherlands the Nazis formally
applied Dutch immigration law. What was uppermost in most peoples' minds, one suspects,
was that the Frank family, like many others, were forcibly taken from their home and what
happened to them once they were in the hands of the occupying power.
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sands of the civilian inhabitants of those territories, especially Jews and
Poles, and by making these people disappear without a trace, thereby terror-
izing into submission those left behind. 103 The description of these practices
at this trial, undoubtedly known to the negotiators of Geneva IV, makes it
clear that the Night and Fog tactics applied to all resistors of occupation and
all others who incurred the wrath of the Nazis, irrespective of alienage or
legal status and indeed often based on racial discrimination that served to
target the Jewish inhabitants of the occupied territories, whether or not they
were aliens or citizens. Contrary to what Goldsmith suggests, it is ahistori-
cal to suggest either that the Nazi acts that were the focus of Article 49 tar-
geted only legal aliens and citizens of occupied territories or that the draft-
ers of Geneva IV were only concerned with such acts. As would be ex-
pected, delegate after delegate to Geneva IV focused on the abominable
Nazi practices and sought to strengthen the interdictory provisions of Arti-
cle 49.104 The evidence suggests that the forcible, mass removal of entire
groups, alien and citizen alike, that the Nazis in fact engaged in, not nice
distinctions between the legal statuses of those forcibly transferred and tor-
tured abroad, were foremost on their minds.
While it is possible that removal of illegal aliens by an occupying
power consistent with local immigration law was simply not contemplated
by the delegates, the same delegates were so acutely aware of the breadth of
their prohibition in Article 49 that they carefully discussed possible excep-
tions and explicitly included, as part of Article 49, only two-permitting
total or partial evacuation of a given area if security of the population or
imperative military reasons so demand and imposing strict conditions in-
tended to protect evacuees even in those circumstances. 105 The discussion of
103 See Altstoetter, supra note 20, at 1032-33, 1056-62.
104 See, e.g., FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, supra
note 99, at 664 (emphasizing the need to formally prohibit "deplorable practices ... where
men had been loaded into trucks like cattle, and sent to distant countries to do forced labour"
and the need to "avoid mass transfers of the population, such as had taken place during the
last war") (statement by Soviet Delegate); Id. at 760 (condemning the numbers of women
and children from Indonesia to perform forced labor abroad) (statement by Netherlands
Delegate); Id. at 664 (noting that the Committee was unanimous in condemning "abominable
practice of deportation" and the "sole purpose of every speaker had been to strengthen the
interdictory provisions of the Article") (statement by Chairman). Broad condemnation of all
Nazi transfers from occupied territory, not distinctions between aliens and others, would
appear to reflect the object and purpose of the drafters.
105 Geneva IV, supra note 14, art. 49. The full text of Article 49 of Geneva IV:
Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons
from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power to that of any other
country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.
Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a
given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so de-
mand. Such evacuations may not involve the displacement of protected persons
2006]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
these exceptions reveals drafters who were very wary of making exceptions
to their ban on forcible transfers and keenly interested in protecting all civil-
ians affected. 0 6 This is suggested, for example, in the provision in Article
49 requiring evacuees to be "transferred back to their homes as soon as hos-
tilities in the area in question have ceased."
The negotiating history and language of the rest of Article 49 show
that its drafters were quite concerned about ensuring that any exception to
forcible transfers contain explicit guarantees to avoid abuse and to protect
the interests of civilians. If the drafters intended to allow for an exception
for the relocation of illegal aliens, as Goldsmith argues, one would expect to
see it, along with some guarantees against abuse (such as assurances that
such aliens are accorded some kind of due process or at least the process to
which they are due under local law, that they are not being relocated to
places that will harm them, and that they are being relocated due to the se-
curity or other needs of the occupied state and not solely for the benefit or at
the say-so of the Occupying Power). While some such exception might have
been desirable, there is no evidence it was contemplated.
Goldsmith's assertion that it makes no sense for Article 49 to permit
illegal aliens to be imprisoned in occupied territory for violation of local
immigration laws but not permit their deportation ignores the historical con-
text. If as the Altstoetter case suggests, one of the problems with Nazi Night
and Fog scheme was that it made it difficult to keep track of persons once
they were removed from occupied territory, it makes sense to force an Oc-
cupying Power to go through a formal criminal or immigration process but
not permit anything that could slide into secret disappearances in the dead
outside the bounds of the occupied territory except when for material reasons it is
impossible to avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred
back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.
The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure, to
the greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to receive
the protected persons, that the removals are effected in satisfactory conditions of
hygiene, health, safety and nutrition, and that member of the same family are not
separated.
The Protecting Power shall be informed of any transfers and evacuations as soon as
they have taken place.
The Occupying Power shall not detain protected persons in an area particularly ex-
posed to the dangers of war unless the security of the population or imperative
military reasons so demand.
The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian popula-
tion into the territory it occupies.
Id.
106 See, e.g., FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, supra
note 99, at 760 (comments of Danish delegate on the object and purpose of the evacuation
provisions); see also ICRC Commentary, supra note 96, at 280.
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of night. Geneva IV insists on such process to permit detention within occu-
pied territory and, as is clear from its Article 45, precludes deportation or
transfer unless a protected person (1) is accused of an ordinary crime and
(2) is extradited pursuant to an extradition treaty that had been in place prior
to the outbreak of hostilities. 107 The same concern with process appears in
the provision that Goldsmith mentions, Article 76(1), which otherwise bars
those formally accused of crimes from being removed from occupied terri-
tory. 108
For these reasons, Goldsmith's attempts to read illegal aliens out of
the protections of Article 49 are contrary to the plain meaning, object and
purpose, and context of Geneva IV.
Goldsmith's second conclusion, that despite the categorical ban on
transfers and deportations in Article 49, anyone in occupied territory, in-
cluding aliens and citizens, can be taken out of occupied territory for some
unspecified time to be interrogated at the behest of the Occupying Power, is
even more implausible. Again, Goldsmith reads this exception, nowhere
suggested by the plain terms of Article 49, into the words "deportation" and
"transfer." Again, he can get no help from dictionary definitions since, as he
acknowledges, the plain meaning of "transfer" is to remove from one place
to another, even for a temporary period of time. 109 Again, he argues that the
ban on "forcible transfers" should effectively be read out of Article 49. But
in this case, Goldsmith's interpretation of "transfer" to mean only perma-
nent or indefinite resettlement is belied by the terms of Article 49 itself,
since its second paragraph, providing a guarantee that evacuated persons
"be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in ques-
tion have ceased" expressly calls such temporary evacuations "transfers"
and requires these to be as short as possible. The drafters of Article 49 obvi-
107 Geneva IV, supra note 14, art. 45 ("the provisions of this Article [precluding transfer to
another power] do not constitute an obstacle to the extradition, in pursuance of extradition
treaties concluded before the outbreak of hostilities, of protected persons accused of offences
against ordinary criminal law").
108 Memo 28, supra note 9, at 374-75, 379 (suggesting that the procedural protections that
attach to suspected offenders after they have been accused triggers special concerns). Oddly,
Goldsmith does not mention Article 45 of Geneva IV which permits extradition of those
accused of ordinary crimes if pursuant to a pre-existing extradition treaty. It might be argued
that given the special concerns prompted by a determination that someone is an "illegal"
alien, including the worry that such a determination might be pretextual in the special cir-
cumstances of an occupation that is resisted by the local population and the worries,
prompted by then recent Nazi policies, of what may befall such hapless refugees once re-
moved from the country in which they reside, the drafters of Geneva IV would opt to limit
the discretion of an Occupying Power to remove such individuals from occupied territory
unless they have been charged with an ordinary crime and extradited to a country that will
not persecute them pursuant to an extradition treaty. See Geneva IV, supra note 14, art. 45.
109 Memo 28, supra note 9, at 375.
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ously used the word "transfer" to mean what its plain meaning suggests, that
is any removal even for a temporary period.
In this instance as well, Goldsmith attempts to draw support for his
strained interpretation from the Nazi policies that were allegedly the target
of Article 49. He suggests that these involved, exclusively, the resettlement
of the inhabitants of occupied territory elsewhere for a "permanent, ex-
tended, or at least indefinite duration."' 10 But there was abundant evidence,
widely known to the negotiators of Geneva IV, that Nazi transfer policies,
especially under their Night and Fog decrees, were not limited to "perma-
nent, extended, or at least indefinite resettlement." As was made crystal
clear in the Altstoetter trial proceedings, although the Nazis exterminated
many of those that they removed from occupied territory, their Night and
Fog policies extended to vast numbers of persons who were removed in
secret from occupied territories, subjected to "brutal third degree methods"
of interrogation, but who were detained abroad only for varying periods of
time." 1' The evidence presented at trial showed "that many of the Night and
Fog prisoners who were deported to Germany were not charged with serious
offenses and were given comparatively light sentences or acquitted.",12
Indeed, the directive that was the subject of criminal charges against the
Nazi Minister of Justice explicitly provided that if a transferred person was
found innocent it would be up to the Secret Police to decide "whether the
accused can be released and return[ed] into the occupied territories," while
others could be handed over to the Secret Police "for detention for the dura-
tion of the war."'1 3 It is also clear from the judgment of these tribunals that
the central concern of the judges, and presumably of those who drafted Ar-
ticle 49, was not the length of time a transferred person was kept outside of
occupied territory but the inhuman treatment suffered by those who were
removed (including during their periods of detention and interrogation), the
discriminatory policies that led to his being selected for transfer, the secrecy
of the process of removal, the cruel "terrorist" impact on those left behind,
as well as, of course, that for some, secret removal, even for a short period,
meant death. "14
The tribunals associated the secret transport of the inhabitants with
the "torture of civilians by the occupying forces,"'"15 precisely because this
is what the Nazis did. They enforced Control Council Law No. 10 (which
barred deportation of the civilian population from occupied territory "to
110 Id. at 378.
1 Altstoetter, supra note 20, at 1056.
,12 Id. at 1058.
113 Id. at 1052.
114 See, e.g., id. at 1031-62.
15 See id. at 1061.
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slave labour or for any other purpose") precisely because, as the Nuremberg
tribunal had held, the removal of inhabitants from occupied territories for
the purpose of "efficient and enduring intimidation" constituted a violation
of the laws and customs of war. 
116
For anyone grounded in the history with which this treaty was in-
tended to deal, it is absurd to contend that the object and purpose of Article
49 (or of Geneva IV generally) was to cut back on the protections recog-
nized at Nuremberg and the occupation trials and permit an occupying
power to transfer any and all individuals abroad to places unknown for pur-
poses of interrogation. As with respect to the contention that illegal aliens
were not intended to be protected, one would expect such an extraordinary
exception to the clear prohibitory words of the first sentence in Article 49 to
appear alongside the other limited exceptions provided in the rest of Article
49 if it had been at all anticipated. Such an exception, like those that are
addressed in the second through fourth paragraphs of Article 49, would also
have included guarantees against abuse (such as providing that transfers not
be to places where maltreatment was likely or probable). The premise that
the drafters of Article 49 would have approved of a free-floating exception
for short-term relocations that could only be of benefit to the Occupying
Power, while ignoring explicit safeguards to prevent abuse of those forcibly
removed to "facilitate interrogation," is inconsistent with the whole of Arti-
cle 49 and the convention's object and purpose. 11 7
116 Id. at 1057. Indeed one of the reasons that Schlegelberger, the Minister of Justice, was
convicted at this trial was precisely that he was instrumental in quashing the proceedings
against a police officer who allegedly obtained a confession by beating a prisoner. Id. at
1085-86.
117 Goldsmith's interpretation also renders the war crime defined in Article 49 unnecessar-
ily ambiguous. Memo 28, supra note 9. As he acknowledges in a footnote, his free-floating
exception does not provide precise guidance as to how long a protected person may be held
outside occupied territory before a grave breach of Geneva IV may be deemed to have been
committed. Id. at 379 n.14. Although Goldsmith offers to provide "additional guidance" as
necessary on this point, the effect of Goldsmith's interpretation is to a turn a relatively clear
war crime that, as originally stated, gave clear notice that a crime is committed when a de-
finitive act occurs (namely when persons are removed from occupied territory) to one that
might be committed at some indefinite time in the future to be defined on a "case by case"
basis by Goldsmith and other government attorneys. This renders the intended protection
given to individuals in occupied territory less predictable and subject to subjective discretion
by the occupier, transfers a cognizable war crime into an vague injunction that may violate
the principle of nullen crimen sine lege, and makes government officials that might be ac-
cused of grave breaches of Article 49 judges in their own cause. Cf Staples v United States,
511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994) (lenity requires that ambiguous criminal statutes be construed in
favor of the accused); Waldron, supra note 11 (arguing that the demand for precision on the
degree of "severity" needed to constitute torture in the Bybee/Yoo memorandum is intended
precisely to exploit the rule in Staples for the benefit of the state). Indeed, the rule of lenity is
deployed precisely to this effect in one of the most notorious of the torture memoranda,
Bybee's January 22, 2002 memorandum to Gonzales. See Memo 6, supra note 15, at 83 n.4.
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Goldsmith's other stated reason for an interpretation that is so at
odds with plain meaning and object and purpose is that a more literal inter-
pretation of Article 49 would make Articles 51 and 76, which address the
abuse of those convicted of crimes and the use of slave labor, superfluous.
This argument is specious. As he acknowledges but chooses to dismiss, this
contention ignores the ICRC commentary indicating that these additional
guarantees were included out of an abundance of caution. 118 Articles 51 and
76 were intended to reinforce Article 49's provisions by targeting specific
Nazi abuses. 19 These specific guarantees were, like Article 49 itself,
grounded in the Nazi abominations canvassed at Nuremberg and the occu-
pation trials and were separately mentioned precisely because, as delegates
to this negotiation repeatedly stated, their governments as well as people
around the world expected Geneva IV to indicate clearly that such acts
would themselves violate international law. In addition, as in the case of
Article 51 (regarding slave labor), they wanted to ensure that some viola-
tions would also constitute distinct "grave breaches" chargeable as distinct
war crimes, quite apart from the act of forcibly transferring persons from
occupied territories. 120 Insofar as such provisions were intended to guide a
war crimes prosecutor and to stigmatize these distinct acts as separate inter-
national crimes or breaches of treaty law, they are not superfluous.
For all these reasons, the Goldsmith memorandum also tortures the
law of treaties, albeit with more subtlety than some of the other torture
memoranda.
VI. THE BROADER CONTEXT OF THE GOLDSMITH MEMORANDUM
The timing of the Goldsmith memorandum, March 19, 2004, pro-
vides some necessary context. Goldsmith drafts his opinion in the wake of
the February 2004 Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross
("ICRC"), which documented numerous apparent violations of Geneva law
during the arrest, internment and interrogation of detainees in occupied
Iraq, 121 and amid growing news reports of abuses and even deaths while
118 See Memo 28, supra note 9, at 379 n.13.
119 ICRC Commentary, supra note 96, at 279, 363.
120 See Geneva IV, supra note 14, art. 147 (including as a grave breach "compelling a
protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power"). See also Rome Statute, supra
note 62, art. 8(2)(a)(v) (recognizing the war crime of compelling a POW or other protected
person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power) and art. 8(2)(a)(vii) (recognizing war crime
of unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement).
12 1 This Report was not made public until November 2004, the same month when the exis-
tence of the Goldsmith memorandum was made public. For the text of the ICRC Report, see
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) ON THE TREATMENT
BY THE COALITION FORCES OF PRISONERS OF OTHER PROTECTED PERSONS BY THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS IN IRAQ DURING ARREST, INTERNMENT AND INTERROGATION (Feb. 2004), re-
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under U.S. detention elsewhere. 22 His memorandum is also contemporane-
ous with the first investigative report, by the U.S. government itself, of de-
tainee abuses in Iraq, the Taguba Report. 123 At the same time, Goldsmith's
memorandum precedes by a month the public revelation of the infamous
photos at Abu Ghraib and the subsequent leaking of the many torture
memoranda that make up The Torture Papers. Yet, by the time Goldsmith is
asked his opinion, it is too late for the Administration to back away from its
public position, affirmed by the Security Council, that Geneva law unques-
printed in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 383 [hereinafter ICRC Report]. This Report
describes the pattern of arrests in occupied Iraq by U.S. personnel the following way:
Arresting authorities entered houses usually after dark, breaking down doors, wak-
ing up residents roughly, yelling orders, forcing family members into one room
under military guard while searching the rest of the house and further breaking
doors, cabinets, and other property. They arrested suspects, tying their hands in the
back with flexi-cuffs, hooding them, and taking them away. Sometimes they ar-
rested all adult males present in a house, including elderly, handicapped or sick
people. Treatment often included pushing people around, insulting, taking aim with
rifles, punching and kicking and striking with rifles. Individuals were often led
away in whatever they happened to be wearing at the time of arrest-sometimes in
pajamas or underwear-and were denied the opportunity to gather a few essential
belongings, such as clothing, hygiene items, medicine, or eyeglasses...
In almost all instances documented by the ICRC, arresting authorities provided no
information about who they were, where their base was located, nor did they ex-
plain the cause of arrest. Similarly, they rarely informed the arrestee or his family
where he was being taken and how long, resulting in the de facto "disappearance"
of the arrestee for weeks or even months until contact was finally made.
When arrests were made in the streets, along the roads, or at checkpoints, families
were not informed about what had happened to the arrestees until they managed to
trace them or received news about them through persons who had been deprived of
their liberty but were later released, visiting family members of fellow persons de-
prived of their liberty, or ICRC Red Cross Messages. In the absence of a system to
notify the families of the whereabouts of their arrested relatives, many were left
without news for months, often fearing that their relatives unaccounted for were
dead.
Id. at 388-89.
This report also includes an extensive list of the types of ill-treatment reported during de-
tainee interrogations and indicates that the physical and psychological coercion involved "in
some cases might amount to torture." Id. at 391-93. It also includes warnings that certain
methods of confinement, such as prolonged solitary confinement in cells devoid of sunlight
for 23 hours a day, violate Geneva III and IV. Id. at 398.
122 See Two Inmate Deaths at U.S. Base Ruled Homicides, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003, § 1, at
14; Jess Bravin & Gary Fields, How Do U.S. Investigators Make a Captured Terrorist Talk?,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2003, at B 1; Van Natta, Jr., supra note 8; Press Release, Human Rights
Watch, United States: Reports of Torture of Al-Qaeda Suspects (Dec. 27, 2002), available at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/12/US 1227.htm.
123 ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, MAJOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARTICLE 15-6
INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS,
supra note 1, at 405 [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT].
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tionably extends to Iraq. Unlike Bybee and Yoo, Goldsmith does not have
the option of simply declaring Geneva IV inapplicable to Iraqi detainees
because this is a new kind of occupation involving "terrorists" or "unlawful
combatants." 1
24
Goldsmith's memorandum is written at a time when it was becom-
ing ever more probable that U.S. personnel would face disciplinary proceed-
ings (at least for the abuses that were the subject of the Taguba Report) and
where, therefore, U.S. soldiers themselves would be increasingly likely to
raise questions should they witness continuing maltreatment of Iraq prison-
ers. 25 Goldsmith is asked to express his opinion about whether it is legal
for the U.S. to remove individuals from Iraq for purposes of interrogation
precisely at a time when there is increasing scrutiny and growing public
distrust about U.S. interrogation methods inside Iraq; when, in short, the
possibility of continuing maltreatment of Iraqi detainees is becoming unten-
able both as a legal and as a public relations matter.
Given the revelations of U.S. abuses of detainees then becoming
public, it is difficult to believe that Goldsmith could have been unaware of
the uses to which his arguments might be put. While there may indeed be
some legitimate reasons for interrogating some persons outside Iraq, the
most obvious reasons do so-and to demand a detailed legal memorandum
from the Office of Legal Counsel for this purpose-is precisely to avoid the
scrutiny that interrogations inside Iraq would present or to use foreign per-
sonnel to engage in interrogations under conditions that would be deemed
objectionable if undertaken by U.S. personnel. Both before and certainly
after Goldsmith writes his memorandum, there were growing and widely
available reports, in the press and by human rights groups, that the United
States appeared to be "outsourcing" torture (and other forms of coercive
interrogation techniques) by sending those it suspected of being involved in
terrorism to countries that the State Department itself has identified as regu-
lar practitioners of torture, including Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia,
124 Indeed, only a few days after the Goldsmith memorandum, John Yoo opined in the Wall
Street Journal that while Geneva law operates in Iraq, it has no operation in the broader war
against terrorism. John Yoo, Terrorists Have No Geneva Rights, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2004,
at A16.
125 See, e.g., Geneva IV, supra note 14, art. 31 ("no physical or moral coercion shall be
exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from
third parties"); Id. art. 32 (banning "any measures of brutality" whether applied by civilian or
military agents). For just such an incident, see Torture by Proxy, supra note 9, at 17 (report-
ing an instance in which U.S. National Guard soldiers on patrol encountered a walled com-
pound with dozens of abused Iraqi detainees and set out to rescue them only to be told to
withdraw and to return the detainees to their Iraqi jailers). Indeed, if press reports are accu-
rate, Goldsmith's own actions in rejecting the recommendations of the earlier Bybee/Yoo
memoranda may have made it more difficult for U.S. personnel themselves to engage in the
harsh interrogation tactics banned by existing law. See Klaidman et al., supra note 93.
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Yemen, and Syria. 12 6 Indeed, five days after Goldsmith writes his memo-
randum, on May 24, 2004, Newsweek reported that the United States was
allegedly running a covert charter airline to move CIA prisoners from one
secret facility to another. 127 While the United States has never confirmed
the accuracy of these reports, by the time Goldsmith was asked for his opin-
ion, there had been numerous public statements by various U.S. government
officials that are consistent with a policy of relying on others to undertake
forms of interrogation that the U.S. government had been required to fore-
swear in the glare of Abu Ghraib, particularly within Iraq. 1
28
Although the Goldsmith opinion is, according to its precise terms,
limited to the rare case where the U.S. government is an occupying power
(namely Iraq),129 a legal opinion that concludes that our government can
seize anyone that it wishes from territory over which it exercises de facto
control and can transfer such individuals to places unknown for unspecified
periods of time for purposes of interrogation, encourages such transfers
generally and has broader implications. At a minimum, it gives U.S. inter-
rogators an additional illegal tool: the threat to send any detainee abroad to
places where he will be tortured by others. 130 The potential for grave human
rights abuses is particularly evident when the same government that is given
this license had not, at least at the time this memorandum was written, yet
publicly renounced the absurdly narrow definition of torture in the By-
bee/Yoo memoranda and later, when it does so, only affirms that "United
126 See Torture by Proxy, supra note 9, at 8. Even if at the time he wrote his memorandum
Goldsmith was unaware of the Bybee/Yoo torture memoranda, he surely was aware of these
media reports.
127 Jon Barry et al, supra note 12. On the same date, Seymour Hersh reported that extraor-
dinary renditions were part of a special access program (SAP) approved at the highest levels
of the Bush Administration involving forceful interrogations by highly trained U.S. com-
mandos and operatives at secret detention centers scattered around the world. Seymour M.
Hersh, The Gray Zone: How a Secret Pentagon Program Came to Abu Ghraib, NEW
YORKER, May 24, 2004, at 42 [hereinafter Hersh, The Gray Zone]. See also Seymour M.
Hersh, Chain of Command: How the Department of Defense Mishandled the Disaster at Abu
Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May 17, 2004, at 38 (2004). If true, transfers from Iraq and elsewhere
may be resulting in violations of the ban on torture and inhuman treatment by the U.S. itself,
and not just the outsourcing of such methods.
128 For examples of such public statements, see Torture by Proxy, supra note 9, at 5, 13-15.
See also id. at 9-13 (citing numerous examples identified in that report of particular individu-
als allegedly transferred from 1995 to 2002 to places likely to torture them).
129 But note that even with respect to Iraq, the Goldsmith memorandum potentially affects a
much larger number of people than, for example, Guantdnamo. See, e.g., Matt Kelley, Num-
ber of Prisoners Held by US. in Iraq Doubled in Five Months, AP WORLDSTREAM
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 30, 2005, Westlaw, APWORLD database (reporting that the U.S. was hold-
ing 10,500 persons in Iraq).
130 See, e.g., Parry, supra note 8, at 250 (citing media reports of such threats by U.S. inter-
rogators).
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States personnel" do not engage in torture while continuing to hedge on the
use of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment at least with respect to those
held outside the United States.' 
3
'
If the Goldsmith memorandum continues to reflect existing U.S.
policy, the Administration's renunciations of the Bybee/Yoo view of torture
are hollow indeed, amounting to a statement that U.S. government officials
will not themselves engage in certain interrogation techniques (at least in-
side U.S. territory) but will not seek to prevent others to whom it transfers
people from doing so (and may in fact be engaged in such transfers antici-
pating just such an outcome). If, even in the context of Iraq, a country that
at least at the time the Goldsmith memorandum was written was unques-
tionably subject to Geneva law and remains the focus of intense media and
UN scrutiny, we insist on our right to transfer any and all individuals to
"facilitate interrogation" to other countries, is it realistic to expect that we
are not engaged in outsourcing torture elsewhere where we face not the re-
ciprocal rules of Geneva but only the constraints of human rights instru-
ments (such as the Torture Convention, the Refugee Convention, the
ICCPR, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) that the Admini-
stration's other memoranda suggest do not really have the force of law?
The Goldsmith memorandum adheres to the pattern of the rest of
The Torture Papers. Like the more notorious memoranda in that collection,
it too gives the executive's architects of the U.S. "war" on terrorism "the
benefit of the doubt on issues of intent and criminal responsibility while at
the same time eagerly denying such accommodations to those at whom the
policies were directed."'' 32 It too denies the equal application of the law and
has a deaf ear for legal conclusions that encourage national, ethnic, or reli-
gious discrimination. 133 Like the other torture memoranda, Goldsmith's
adheres to a depressingly familiar formula: (1) find a location that is rela-
tively impervious to judicial scrutiny, (2) deflect, rescind or avoid Geneva
law, and (3) provide a legal interpretation that protects U.S. personnel from
criminal prosecution (if only by turning a previously precise war crime into
a vague one subject to the rule of lenity). 134 If the Bybee/Yoo memoranda
inevitably led to abuses within U.S. custody (as journalists like Seymour
Hersh have forcefully contended based on anonymous government
131 Comey Memo, supra note 23, at 2. Indeed, even after issuing this new memorandum,
Bush Administration officials continued to resist Congressional attempts to extend the Presi-
dent's ban on inhumane treatment to employees of the CIA. See Amann, supra note 13, at
2100, 2100 n.57. For suggestions in the media that Goldsmith's memorandum was connected
to reports of "ghost detainees" from Iraq, see Dana Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees
Out ofIraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2004, at Al.
132 Joshua L. Dratel, The Legal Narrative, in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at xxi.
133 Id.
134 Id. at xxii. See also Memo 6, supra note 15, at 83 n.4 (discussing the rule of lenity).
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sources), 135 the Goldsmith memorandum may have become a roadmap to
the outsourcing of torture and other forms of abuse.
As others have addressed in detail, numerous treaty obligations of
the United States-namely the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the ICCPR,
the Torture Convention, and the Refugee Convention-prohibit the re-
foulement or transfer of an individual to another state where that person
faces the danger or risk of torture.' 36 That obligation also exists under cus-
tomary law and some of these treaties also require such "extraordinary ren-
ditions" to be criminalized. 137 The tests for determining when the refoule-
ment prohibition operates vary. Under the Torture Convention the ban exists
where there is a "substantial likelihood" that the transferred individual "may
be in danger of torture."'' 38 As interpreted by the Human Rights Committee,
the ICCPR bans such transfers where the transferees may be at "real risk" of
either torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 139 For its part the
Refugee Convention protects individuals with a "well-founded fear of per-
secution" on specific enumerated grounds. 140 As the Goldsmith memoran-
dum acknowledges (albeit in a brief footnote), violation of Article 49 of
Geneva IV constitutes a "grave breach" and is therefore a war crime. 141 In
addition, U.S. law makes it a federal crime to commit, attempt to commit, or
conspire to commit an act of torture outside the United States. 1
42
135 See Hersh, The Grey Zone, supra note 127. See also The Road to Abu Ghraib, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, June, 2004, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604/.
136 See generally Torture by Proxy, supra note 9 (surveying non-refoulement treaty obliga-
tions). See also Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413 (ser. A) (1996). For discus-
sion of the absolute nature of the non-refoulement obligation in Article 3 of the Torture Con-
vention, see Torture by Proxy, supra note 9, at 82-83 (discussing international decisions that
apply in the context of terrorism and describing the prohibition as ajus cogens norm).
137 Torture by Proxy, supra note 9, at 31.
138 Torture Convention, supra note 14, art. 3(1). See also Torture by Proxy, supra note 9, at
36-37.
139 See, e.g., Torture by Proxy, supra note 9, at 54-56 (discussing the Human Rights Com-
mittee's interpretation of Article 7 of the ICCPR and suggesting that the "real risk" standard
requires a higher showing than the Torture Convention's "in danger of" standard).
140 Refugee Convention, supra note 14, art. 33(1). See also Torture by Proxy, supra note 9,
at 68-69.
141 Memo 28, supra note 9, at 379 n. 13 (noting Article 147 of Geneva IV). As is suggested
by the statutes for the ad hoc war crimes tribunals in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia and
judgments issued by these tribunals, "grave breaches" of Geneva law also constitute war
crimes under customary international law. See, e.g., Torture by Proxy, supra note 9, at 67, 67
n.364-65.
142 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a) (2000). See Torture by Proxy, supra note 9, at 49-50. But while
U.S. regulations implement the Torture Convention's non-refoulement obligation by requir-
ing certain determinations to be made prior to removal or transfer of individuals from the
territory of the United States, these do not apply to persons being transferred by, or with the
complicity of, U.S. actors outside the United States to third states. See id. at 50-54 (contend-
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The Goldsmith memorandum barely says a word about any of these
obligations. It merely concludes that Geneva's non-transfer obligation does
not apply either to illegal aliens or to others removed from occupied Iraq for
temporary periods. 143 Of course, all of the obligations surveyed above be-
come highly relevant to the extent the memorandum's conclusions are erro-
neous. Nonetheless, it might be suggested that since the Goldsmith memo-
randum does not itself anticipate that "facilitating interrogation" will facili-
tate the infliction of torture or other forms of cruel treatment, it would be
unfair to classify the Goldsmith memorandum, alongside the Bybee/Yoo
memorandum, as part and parcel of a broader U.S. conspiracy to commit
torture, especially if transfer from Iraq is intended precisely to permit inter-
rogation by non-U.S. officials.44
I leave to others to consider whether U.S. officials are less morally
culpable when their role is limited to making persons available to others
whom it expects will abuse or even torture the transferred individuals. But
even assuming this were true, the subcontracting of torture to non-U.S. offi-
cials has its own nefarious effects. Given the United States' leadership posi-
tion with respect to showing the world what measures can be legally taken
in the "war" on terrorism, when U.S. officials acquiesce in such activity by
others, enable such activity to take place, or use information obtained else-
where by improper methods, it is suggesting, in a manner that is inevitably
known to other governments, that such measures can be taken and will not
be penalized. The United States' subcontracting of torture undermines the
ban on torture and inhuman treatment no less than if it were engaging in
such activity itself. It is difficult to maintain that these prohibitions are erga
omnes obligations if all we are saying is that we do not do them. Of course,
the U.S. subcontracting example may prove influential to others with a
reputation for relatively strong compliance with human rights norms. 145 In
ing that this regulatory gap constitutes a breach of U.S. obligations to fully implement the
torture convention).
143 See Memo 28, supra note 9.
144 Indeed, as noted at supra note 93, there are unconfirmed reports that Goldsmith himself
may have played a prominent role in convincing the Administration to renounce the harsh
interrogation techniques condoned by the earlier Bybee/Yoo memoranda. See Posting of
Marty Lederman, Silver Linings (or, the Strange But True Fate of the Second (or was it the
Third?) OLC Torture Memo, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/09/silver-linings-or-strange-
but-true.htm (Sept. 21, 2005, 18:08 EST).
145 See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Evidence Grows that Canada Aided in Having Terrorism
Suspects Interrogated in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2005, at A7 (describing inquiry into
Canadian use of information allegedly obtained from four Canadian citizens under torture).
Of course, to the extent the U.S. engages in such behavior it is sending clear messages about
how best to evade the letter of the law while violating its spirit. See, e.g., Torture by Proxy,
supra note 9, at 15, 29-30 (noting that despite apparent strictures on the CIA from engaging
in, providing advice about, or encouraging the use of torture, there are media reports that the
CIA is in fact using a narrow definition of what counts as "knowing," such that it is not
[Vol. 37:175
TORTURING THE LAW
any case, as noted above, international criminal principles of complicity,
conspiracy, and aiding and abetting anticipate criminal liability for knowing
acquiescence in illegal activity by others, even if the principal perpetrator is
unidentified or if their guilt cannot be proven, and even if the accomplice
did not "wish" that the principal offense be committed. 146 International
criminal law also anticipates command responsibility for the outsourcing of
torture. 1
47
VII. TORTURING THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The Goldsmith memorandum shares one other feature with the
other torture memoranda. It reflects a mode of lawyering that tortures the
rules of professional responsibility. It too is a public stain on the already
dubious reputation of lawyers. Like the Bybee/Yoo memoranda, the Gold-
smith memorandum reflects a result-oriented approach in which the gov-
ernment lawyer whose advice is sought starts with the objective that the
lawyer believes the client wants and works backward to achieve it, even at
the expense of the law itself. 14
8
The Goldsmith memorandum, like most of the other torture memo-
randa, consists of lawyers' advice with respect to actions that their clients
are contemplating (and perhaps have begun to undertake). This memoran-
dum, like the others, was not drafted for purposes of public consumption.
But the fact that these memoranda were never intended to be published on
the front page of the New York Times (as many of them ultimately were)
and that presumably they would have been written differently if their au-
thors had anticipated publication is hardly an exculpatory fact. On the con-
trary, that they were written in confidence by lawyers to their clients is all
the more reason to expect that these memoranda would frankly acknowl-
edge that law is a system of constraints and that lawyerly advice most often
consists of informing clients about these constraints-and not in pretending
that such constraints do not exist simply because they get in the way of what
the client wants to achieve. Legal memoranda written with due regard for
the rules of professional responsibility would have provided their intended
"knowing" when the CIA is not physically in the room where the torture occurs but may be
feeding the questions to the interrogators or even be observing the interrogations through
one-way mirrors). Cf Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, supra note 40, 15, 19
(condemning the commission of torture at the instigation of or with the consent or acquies-
cence of a public official, and including acts by private contractors). Such behavior, by the
supposed exemplar of human rights norms, does grave damage to U.S. foreign policy inter-
ests.
146 See, e.g., Torture by Proxy, supra note 9, at 71 n.390 (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998)).
147 See id. at 74-76.
148 See, e.g., Dratel, supra note 132, at xxii.
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recipients with considerably different, or at least considerably more cautious
or nuanced, advice.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require lawyers to give
candid, independent and professional, not sycophantic, advice. 49 To the
extent the memoranda assume, as many of them do, that the client was seek-
ing legal help before taking action or making public announcements in reli-
ance upon the advice, they should have candidly warned the relevant gov-
ernment officials not only about the risk of criminal prosecutions under U.S.
law but the risk of civil liability for the U.S. government under established
rules of state responsibility. Goldsmith should not have been principally
concerned that if he told his superiors that transferring individuals from Iraq
would be illegal, he would have made it more difficult for them to engage in
coercive interrogation techniques that they wished to use given the intense
glare of media attention within Iraq. Indeed, given the law, his job was pre-
cisely to make taking this option more difficult or at least to warn the execu-
tive branch of the highly controversial and tenuous nature of the interpreta-
tion sought with respect to Article 49.
As Harold Koh and others have noted, all of these memoranda, in-
cluding Goldsmith's, tortured the rules of professional conduct insofar as
they told the clients only what the lawyer believed the client wanted to hear.
They did not enable the client to make an intelligent and informed decision
on the basis of real, not fanciful, law. 150 To this extent, the torture memo-
randa writers failed their clients by not fully and frankly explicating the law.
149 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 13, at 654 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1
(2004)). But see Editorial, The Torture Canard, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2004, at A8 (explain-
ing that the torture memoranda "do what good lawyers do ... advance the arguments that
give their clients the maximum policy discretion. All the more so given that international
courts and human-rights groups are only too eager to allege war crimes against Americans").
One would have thought, on the contrary, that the role of good government attorneys, espe-
cially when being asked about contemplated government action, would be to warn their
clients precisely about the risks posed by international law and human rights advocates so
that neither they, nor the nation, are compromised.
150 Koh, supra note 13, at 655. See also Dratel, supra note 132, at xxii ("slavish dedication
to a superior's imperatives does not serve the client well in the end and reduces the lawyer's
function to that of a gold-plated rubber stamp"). As the Wall Street Journal indicated, ironi-
cally in defending the torture memoranda, they "make the legal case for why the President is
not bound by international treaties or federal law regarding the treatment of certain detainees
in the war on terror." The Torture Canard, supra note 149. This is precisely what is wrong
from a professional standpoint about them. The Journal editorial writers, like the writers of
the memoranda themselves, appear to confuse the role of a defense attorney after her client
has been charged with a war crime from the role of lawyer being consulted in anticipation of
action that might amount to a war crime. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1
(2004) (rules for advocates), and MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2 (2004)
(advocates have duty to use legal procedure and lawyers "can make good faith arguments in
support of their clients' positions... even though the lawyer believes that the client's posi-
[Vol. 37:175
TORTURING THE LAW
The Goldsmith memorandum affects scholarly detachment. 15' It fo-
cuses like a laser beam on the narrowing parsing of two words, ignoring all
other legal, moral, economic, or social considerations. As Richard Bilder
and Detlev Vagts have suggested, this is not a virtue but suggests another
departure from the Rules of Professional Responsibility, which urge lawyers
to consider the "moral, economic, social and political factors that may be
relevant to the client's situation."'152 While we do not know whether in sub-
sequent drafts or in other memoranda that have not been made public Gold-
smith or other government lawyers provided the needed context or even
renounced their prior views, the March 19, 2004 memorandum does not
remind its recipient, the Attorney General, that should the United States
transfer either illegal aliens or others from Iraq it would need to, in any
case, consistent with the rest of Geneva law, inform the International Red
Cross of such transfers and not do so secretly. 153 Given the contemporane-
ous allegations of U.S.-government sponsored "disappearances" or "phan-
tom" or "ghost" detainees, 5 4 one would have thought that a lawyer provid-
ing a potential roadmap for such acts would have at least reminded his client
that transfers from Iraq, should they take place, cannot be in secret or in the
tion ultimately will not prevail"), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2004)
(rules for counselors), and MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 1 (2004):
A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer's honest as-
sessment. Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client
may be disinclined to confront. In presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to sustain
the client's morale and may put advice in as acceptable a form as honesty permits.
However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the pros-
pect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.
151 For an argument that it is in fact a form of "engaged" scholarship, see Josd E. Alvarez,
A Comment on MacKinnon's Scholarship, in ENGAGED SCHOLARSHIP: CONFRONTING THE
WORLD (forthcoming 2006).
152 Richard Bilder & Detlev Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, 98 AM.
J. INT'L L. 689, 692 n.23 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2004)).
153 Cf. Memo 28, supra note 9, at 374 n.9 (urging careful records to be kept confirming
illegal status of those removed) with Geneva IV, supra note 14, art. 30 (permitting access to
International Red Cross to all protected persons). See also Report of the Special Rapporteur
on Torture, supra note 40, 22 (urging abolition of secret places of detention and stating that
"it should be a punishable offense for any official to hold a person in a secret and/or unoffi-
cial place of detention"); Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20, para. 11,
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.1 (1994) ("To guarantee the effective protection of detained
persons, provisions should be made for detainees to be held in places official recognized as
places of detention and for their names and places of detention, as well as for the names of
persons responsible for their detention, to be kept in registers readily available and accessible
to those concerned, including relatives and friends").
154 See, e.g., TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 123, at 425 (noting that at least in one instance
"ghost detainees" had been hidden from the International Committee of the Red Cross);
Bacchus, supra note 1, at 344-45 (citing media reports from September 2004).
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dead of night like those of the Nazis.155 One would have thought that a
memorandum written in March 2004 would also have warned the Attorney
General of the potential for more embarrassing revelations by the Red Cross
elsewhere should removals be undertaken without enforceable assurances
that U.S. personnel, once out of Iraq, or foreign officials where the transfer-
ees are ultimately sent, would not maltreat them. 156 One would have thought
as well that a memorandum about a treaty provision seeking to prevent
Night and Fog-type tactics would have been accurate about describing those
tactics and would have warned those tempted by them that "facilitating in-
terrogation" without mechanisms for controlling the abuse of power by the
Occupying Power can easily slide into extra-judicial torture and killing. 15 7
Further, one would have thought that a memorandum whose first
conclusion is premised on ostensible respect for local immigration law and
for the principle, drawn from the Hague Regulations, that "an occupying
power should maintain and enforce the domestic laws of the country occu-
pied," 58 would consider whether these are viable or realistic rules in the
context of Iraq in March 2004. If the rule that Goldsmith urges is, as he as-
serts, premised on ensuring "public order and safety,"' 159 there should have
been some discussion about whether, given concerns for public order and
155 See discussion of the ICRC Report supra note 121. See also Report of the Special Rap-
porteur on Torture, supra note 40, 51 (discussing the practice of disappearances as a form
of torture both for the victim and for the relatives left behind), 52 (discussing the role of
torture as a tool to generate terror among the population), 55 (discussing the trauma of being
forcibly uprooted). For a summary of the rights of Iraqi detainees under both international
humanitarian law as well as the law of human rights, see Leila Nadya Sadat, International
Legal Issues Surrounding the Mistreatment of Iraqi Detainees by American Forces, ASIL
INSIGHTS, May 2004, at 5.
156 The usual State Department practice wherein it secures "diplomatic assurances" from a
state to which transferred detainees are sent that it would not engage in torture, seems plainly
inadequate when the state involved is one that the same State Department has branded as a
regular practitioner of torture. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (list of countries to
which we have allegedly sent detainees).
117 Extra-judicial killings while under U.S. custody appear to have taken place. See Andrew
Sullivan, Atrocities in Plain Sight, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 2005, § 7, at 1 ("The Schlesigner
panel has officially conceded, although the President has never publicly acknowledged, that
American soldiers have tortured five inmates to death. Twenty-three other deaths that oc-
curred during American custody had not been fully investigated by the time the panel issued
its report in August."). See also George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003)
(indicating that while "more than 3000 suspected terrorists have been arrested," many others
have met a different fate and "are no longer a problem to the United States and our friends
and allies"), available at http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/0l/print/20030128-
19.html. Cf Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, supra note 40, 41 (discussing the
minimum assurances that should be in place to pre-empt the resort to torture).
158 Memo 28, supra note 9, at 373.
159 Id. at 373. Cf Amann, supra note 13, at 2124 (noting that the Goldsmith memorandum
should have mentioned the "shambled state of the Iraqi legal system").
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safety in Iraq, Iraqi immigration rules and procedures were in fact operative,
and if they are not, whether the forcible transfer of anyone deemed to be
"illegal" by the Occupying Powers could actually undermine public or-
der. 160
Goldsmith also does not address the United States' success in secur-
ing a license from the Security Council that appears to permit it and the
United Kingdom, as 'the Authority,' to deviate from the cited Hague princi-
ple as necessary to transform Iraqi laws and institutions consistent with re-
spect for democracy and human rights; he also does not address why this
deviation was deemed necessary given the perceived human rights flaws in
pre-existing Iraqi law and judicial procedures.' 61 He also does not tell his
client whether the Iraqi immigration law and procedures on which he relies,
which were operative during Saddam's regime, conform with human rights
norms and respect the protection of all protected persons in occupied terri-
tory--consistent with the object and purpose of Geneva IV. 162
Indeed, Goldsmith evinces a near total lack of curiosity with respect
to the fate of those who are suspected of being illegal aliens in pre- or post-
occupation Iraq or those who are rounded up for interrogation without being
charged with a crime once occupation begins. The relevant Iraqi immigra-
tion law and procedures are mentioned in a single paragraph, with no dis-
cussion of what these procedures actually consist of, or even whether, given
conditions in Iraq in March 2004, these would be applied by U.S. or Iraqi
officials. 163 If, as one suspects, at least at the time this memorandum was
written Iraqi immigration procedures were in substantial disarray, there is
grave doubt about whether the transfer of illegal aliens that Goldsmith
claims is legal (or the underlying necessary determination of the legality of
160 This is particularly a concern to the extent the form in which forcibly removals take
place appear, to those left behind, indistinguishable from the policy of disappearances that
have been widely condemned for repressive regimes in Latin America. It can safely be as-
sumed that even the appearance that the U.S. engages in such a policy is ruinous for U.S.
democratization plans in Iraq and the Middle East region.
161 See, e.g., Brett H. McGurk, Revisiting the Law of Nation-Building: Iraq in Transition,
45 VA. J. INT'L L. 451 (2005) (noting need for reinterpretation of occupation law in context
of Iraq); David J. Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 842 (2003) (discuss-
ing the changes to traditional occupation law wrought in the wake of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1483 on Iraq). But see Will Saddam Hussein Get a Fair Trial?, 37 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 21, 24 (2005) (Remarks by Professor Curtis Doebbler contending that the United
States has not abided by the law of occupation because it has "dissolved the judicial institu-
tions of Iraq, and instated its own judges").
Given these Iraqi-specific developments, it is more than a bit ironic that, at least in terms of
applying Article 64 of Geneva IV, Goldsmith applies the strict letter of the treaty, unlike with
respect to Article 49. See Memo 28, supra note 9, at 374.
162 Cf Geneva IV, supra note 14, art. 64 (anticipating the repeal or suspension of local laws
when these become an obstacle to complying with the convention).
163 Cf Memo 28, supra note 9, at 374 (mentioning Iraqi Law No. 118 of 1978).
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their status) would comport with local or other law at all. Goldsmith does
not mention that Geneva law requires that the Red Cross be notified of all
detainees, whether or not they are charged with a crime. 164 The same can be
said with respect to the procedures (never addressed in Goldsmith's memo-
randum) for those forcibly removed from Iraq for purposes of interrogation.
Is the premise of the memorandum that it is not a violation of Geneva law,
international humanitarian law, or international human rights law to force-
fully transfer abroad any civilian that an Occupying Power alleges, and it-
self determines to be an "illegal alien," or other persons that it wants to in-
terrogate, even if local law cannot be given effect and therefore affords such
persons no due process?
I accept the proposition that the Rules of Professional Responsibil-
ity are a less than reliable guide when it comes to determining whom the
"client" is for government attorneys such as those in the Department of De-
fense. Some argue, with considerable force, that the "ultimate client" in
such a case is neither the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General or
even the President, "but the American people," and that therefore govern-
ment attorneys owe their allegiance, as their oath demands, only to the rule
of law or the U.S. constitution. 165 Others suggest that this is overly abstract
and the rules presume that the client is a real human being, presumably the
official who seeks the advice, with whom the lawyer has a real attorney-
client relationship.166 Others debate the specific role of the OLC. Some con-
tend that lawyers in that office owe a special duty to uphold the law since,
as one of the memoranda from Gonzales acknowledges, the OLC's interpre-
tation of all legal issues, both domestic and international, are definitive, at
least for the Executive Branch. 167 Others contend that this Office should not
164 Cf Geneva IV, supra note 14, arts. 136, 140. The sole indirect reference to these obliga-
tions in the Goldsmith memorandum is a footnote recommending that "careful records" be
maintained "confirming the illegal status of each alien who is removed under current domes-
tic law." Memo 28, supra note 9, at 374 n.9. There is no indication about why such records
might be needed or about whether such records need to be made available to anyone, includ-
ing relatives or the International Red Cross.
165 See Lawyers' Statement on Bush Administration's Torture Memos (Aug. 4, 2004),
available at http://www.afj.org/spotlight/0804statement.pdf. See also Koh, supra note 13, at
655 (criticizing the torture memoranda because they were written as if the authors' prime
obligation was to the President or other Administration superiors but not to the Court (much
less the American people)).
166 See generally Julie Angell, Ethics, Torture, and Marginal Memoranda at the DOJ Of-
fice of Legal Counsel, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 557, 560-61 (2005).
167 Memo 7, supra note 12, at 119. See also Angell, supra note 166, at 564-68.
[Vol. 37:175
TORTURING THE LAW
be a neutral expositor of the law but an advocate for the Executive
Branch. 168
The criticism offered here does not require solving these conun-
drums. Even if we assume that the clients in these cases are the executive
branch officials who sought the advice and not the American people, the
rules of professional responsibility anticipate a competent, objective, can-
did, and honest assessment of the relevant law, along with a fulsome con-
sideration of the moral, economic, social and political context in which the
lawyers' advice is sought and will be received. And even assuming that
OLC lawyers cannot or should not act as impartial arbitrators of the law as
if they were Article III judges, those lawyers should, consistent with serving
the executive branch and furthering its policies, provide a competent and
thorough view of the law, particularly when their advice is sought in confi-
dence and when its subject includes, at least in part, contemplated future
action that might run afoul of the law. 169 Of course, every lawyer, in and out
of government, cannot ethically counsel clients "to engage, or assist a client,
in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal" and should warn their clients
of the possibility of adverse consequences. 
170
VIII. CONCLUSION
The U.N. Charter's human rights provisions, the Geneva Conven-
tions, the Nuremberg Trials, the Torture Convention, and the other founda-
tional documents of the international bill of rights, including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR, have a special status. They
are regarded as the constitutive instruments of modern international law for
168 See Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from the
Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1303 (2000) (describing both models but leaning
towards the neutral expositor role).
169 By focusing on the responsibility of lawyers, I do not intend to suggest that their clients
hold no corresponding responsibilities. Government clients have a duty to seek the advice of
lawyers prior to taking legally dubious and especially potentially criminal action, especially
since illegal activity on their part will not only reflect on themselves but on the nation. It
need scarcely be said that in doing so, they should not attempt to defeat the purpose of seek-
ing legal advice by restricting the lawyer's role to providing merely yes and no responses to
unduly narrow inquiries. Clients need to enable their lawyers to provide the fulsome legal
advice anticipated in Rule 2.1. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
"' MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2004). But "a lawyer may discuss the
legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist
a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application
of the law." Id. I leave to experts in professional responsibility the question of whether any of
the torture memoranda violated Rule 1.2(d).
Coercive interrogation techniques may also implicate the ethical responsibilities of other
professions involved. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche & Jonathan H. Marks, When Doctors Go to
War, 352 NEw ENG. J. MED. 3 (2005) (discussing the tensions between the Hippocratic ethi-
cal tradition and the use of medical professionals to assist in coercive interrogation).
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good reason. They marked a transition from using public international law
to address only inter-state problems to using this law to protect the dignity
and life of the individual-regardless of whether the individual is a legal or
illegal alien, a lawful or unlawful combatant, or a mere "inhabitant" of oc-
cupied territory. Nuremberg made clear, in addition, that these obligations
were so essential that violations of certain of them would be criminalized;
that is, that individuals, no matter their status, would henceforth be held
criminally accountable, that certain international crimes were universally
abhorred, and that it would not be a defense from criminal liability to point
to national law of any kind-whether or not this law purported to have
"constitutional" status, addressed the executive branch, or governed the
military. These developments, which the United States helped to forge after
the horrors of a world war, legitimized the use of international legal dis-
course to address issues that all too often had been banished from legal dis-
course altogether.
The Bush Administration's torture memoranda are a massive retro-
grade step wherein those sources of international obligation that are not
ignored or relegated to mere considerations of "policy" are mangled beyond
recognition. 17' The memoranda writers torture the foundational instruments
of modem international law, presumably for policy ends. They attempt to
return us to an age when international law protected only the perceived
needs of certain states as determined by the states themselves. To the extent
the memoranda excuse torture or inhuman treatment when it occurs outside
U.S. territory or is committed by foreigners with U.S. acquiescence, it re-
turns us to a dark period when colonial powers renounced torture for their
citizens while deploying it on those whom they called, with no sense of
irony, the "uncivilized."'' 72 As appears increasingly obvious, the memo-
randa, and the acts that they are believed to have inspired, have gravely
damaged U.S. foreign policy interests, including the war on terrorism, as
well as U.S. claims to be seeking to advance the rule of law, particularly
within Iraq and the rest of the Middle East.
I understand well the conditions under which these memoranda
were produced. During my time as a lawyer in the Legal Adviser's office of
the U.S. Department of State, there were considerable pressures to produce
"can do" memoranda on a variety of topics. I can also understand the frus-
tration of those who produced these memoranda under such pressures only
to have their conclusions, never intended to be made public, scrutinized by
171 For some discomforting parallels, consider the way Nazi lawyers and officials dispar-
aged international law and sought to evade treaty commitments. See, e.g., Detlev Vagts,
International Law in the Third Reich, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 661, 690-93, 696-99 (1990).
172 See, e.g., Ian Brownlie, Interrogation in Depth: The Compton and Parker Reports, 35
Mod. L. Rev. 501 (1972) (discussing the use of these techniques in Kenya, Cyprus, Palestine,
Aden, British Cameroon, and Malaya).
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law professors with the luxury of time and research assistants. Yet the noto-
rious history of Nazi lawyers who "prostitut[ed] ... a judicial system for the
accomplishment of criminal ends" 173 hangs over us all. The debate over
these memoranda is not the usual one among academics advancing compet-
ing or distinct views of the law. As the Altstoetter case demonstrates, when
government lawyers torture the rule of law as gravely as they have done
here, international as well as national crimes may have been committed,
including by the lawyers themselves. 174 Once such memoranda become
public it became the duty of all of us, government lawyer, private citizen,
and law professor alike, not to let their authors off the hook, to closely look
at the conclusions reached, and to consider what our government is alleged
to have done, and is perhaps continuing to do, in their wake. 175 If we do not,
we risk becoming complicit in the torture of human beings as well as the
law.
173 Bilder & Vagts, supra note 152, at 694 (quoting the Altstoetter judgment).
174 As previously noted, the Altstoetter judgment considered and rejected the contention,
raised by the accused Minister of Justice Schlegelberger that his actions prevented even
graver abuses that would have been committed by the "lawless forces under Hitler and
Himmler." Altstoetter, supra note 20, at 1086.
175 Continuing scrutiny of these memoranda may also serve notice as to gaps in U.S. laws.
See supra note 136 (noting gaps in U.S. law on non-refoulement). Cf Torture Outsourcing
Prevention Act, H.R. 952, 109th Cong. (2005) (seeking to prevent extra-judicial renditions to
places known to engage in torture); Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized
World, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2006) (proposing changes in government contracts
to make private contractors used by the U.S. military more accountable).
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